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INTRODUCTION 
The economic outlook for the Community in the current 
year is much less favourable than it appeared in autumn 
last year. In the Community, output is expected to 
increase by less than 1V£% in 1991, half the rate recorded 
in 1990. As a result, growth in employment is likely to 
slow down significantly to less than lA%. This small 
increase in employment will, however, be more than offset 
by the expected increase in the labour force leading to a 
consequent rise in the unemployment rate to 8.7% in 
1991. Despite the slowdown in activity, inflation is 
expected to remain broadly stable at a relatively high level 
(5%). 
The deterioration in the Community's economic perfor-
mance expected in 1991 is only partly explained by events 
in the Gulf region. The increase in oil prices in the second 
half of 1990 and the erosion of business and consumer 
confidence that followed are, without doubt, a direct 
result of the Gulf crisis. Some Community countries were, 
however, already experiencing difficulties well before 
August 1990. External demand was slowing down, with 
negative effects on investment growth, and the necessary 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances was dampening 
internal demand in some countries. 
Despite the current slowdown of activity in the world 
economy, prospects for a resumption of stronger growth 
are good. The Gulf crisis now seems to have had smaller 
and probably more transitory effects on confidence, 
inflation and growth than initially feared. And there are 
incipient signs that the relatively pronounced cyclical 
downturn in some industrial countries - including the 
United States and the United Kingdom - is bottoming 
out. 
The fundamentally healthy underlying growth conditions 
in the Community should therefore reassert themselves. 
These comprise the restoration of profitability during the 
1980s; some progress made in reducing unsustainably 
large budget deficits ; the implementation during the past 
decade of structural reforms aimed at a better functioning 
of markets; the achievement of a more sustainable 
pattern of external balances and - last but not least - the 
European integration prospects. 
These factors have contributed to the relatively good 
performance during the 1983-90 period. To further 
improve the basis for sustained non-inflationary growth 
during the period ahead with the aim of entering the final 
stage of EMU, policy makers must seek to consolidate 
and enhance the gains already made through a continued 
pursuit of the strategy that has been at the basis of the 
improved performance during the 1980s. 
With such policies, the recent economic slowdown in the 
Community is expected to be reversed during the course 
of the year. In 1992 the overall situation is expected to 
improve with output growth reaching 21/4%. Due to lag 
effects, however, employment growth is expected to 
remain at the level of 1991 (0.2%) entailing a further 
modest rise in the unemployment rate to 9.2%. 
A climate of stability is an essential prerequisite for the 
development of the Community's potential. Monetary 
and fiscal policies have therefore to maintain a cautious 
stance. Fiscal policy ought to support to a larger extent 
monetary policy. The standstill of budget consolidation is 
from this viewpoint a cause for concern. Particularly since 
Stage One of Economic and Monetary Union tightens 
convergence requirements in the fields of prices and costs, 
budgetary and external positions. A considerable adjust-
ment has still to be carried out by some member countries. 
Hence speedy implementation of the policy recommen-
dations is essential to prepare succesfully the transition to 
full Economic and Monetary Union. 
I. The economic situation in 1990 and early 1991 
A. Growth slowdown in the Community 
Over the past year the world economy had to adjust to a 
number of events: the dismantling of the centrally 
planned economies of Eastern Europe, German unifi-
cation, growing uncertainties in the Soviet Union and 
finally the Gulf crisis. The Community has weathered this 
difficult international situation relatively well, not least 
because of the powerful stimuli emanating in the short-
term from the German unification process and more 
durably from the progressive implementation of the 
Single Market Programme. Overall, however, a further 
slowdown of real GDP growth in the Community could 
not be prevented : real growth is likely to drop to only Wi 
percent in 1991, about half the rate recorded in 1990, and 
about 2 percentage points less than 1989 (table 1). 
A number of factors have contributed to this outcome, 
such as: 
— the deterioration of the international environment ; 
— a cyclical adjustment within the Community ; 
— the Gulf crisis and the concomitant fall in business 
and consumer confidence. 
TABLE 1 : The E.C. economy at the turn of the decade 
(annual percentage changes) 
real GDP 
employment 
inflation2 
investment 
of which 
equipment 
real unit labour 
costs 
1984-87 
+ 2.6 
+ 0.6 
+ 5.1 
+ 3.3 
+ 6.1 
-1.1 
1988 
+ 4.0 
+ 1.6 
+ 3.7 
+ 9.0 
+ 10.4 
-1.1 
1989 
3.3 
+ 1.6 
+4.9 
+ 6.7 
+ 8.6 
-0.7 
1990 
+ 2.7 
+ 1.6 
+ 5.0 
+4.3 
+ 4.7 
+ 0.6 
1991' 
+ 1.4 
+ 0.2 
+ 5.0 
+ 0.8 
+ 0.2 
+ 0.3 
1992' 
+ 2.3 
+ 0.2 
+ 4.6 
+ 3.7 
+ 4.4 
-0.7 
1 Forecast 
: Private consumption deflator 
1. The worsening of the international environment 
From early 1990 until the first quarter of 1991 the external 
environment has deteriorated continuously: economic 
activity slowed down considerably in the United States, 
Canada and Australia and the restructuring in Central 
and Eastern Europe brought about a contraction of 
activity. Finally the Gulf crisis exacerbated weak trends in 
most countries and particularly in the Middle­East and 
Latin America. Real GDP growth outside the Com­
munity slowed down from 3.2% in 1989 to 1.7% in 1990 
and is likely to slow further in 1991 to less than 1%. Asa 
result import demand by the world outside the Com­
munity only grew by some 4% in 1990 and is forecasted to 
grow by 2 3/4% in 1991, less than half as much as before 
(7.4% in 1989). 
1.1 The United States 
The long expected and largely cyclical slowdown in the 
United States started around mid 1989 and became more 
pronounced throughout 1990. Sharp declines were 
registered in consumer expenditures, in residential 
construction and business investment. The unavoidable 
tightening of monetary policy in 1989 in combination 
with rising private sector indebtedness, which was 
followed in 1990 by credit restrictions resulting from 
tighter standards for financial institutions, have put a 
brake on domestic demand. Demand was further reduced 
by the oil price rise in the second half of 1990. As a result 
real GDP growth dropped from 4.6% in 1988 to 1.0% in 
1990 and will again be very weak in 1991, even if a 
recovery gets underway later in the year (table 2). 
TABLE 2: United States 
(in percent or 
real GNP 
domestic demand 
investment 
consumer prices 
fiscal balance2 
current account 
main economic indicators 
percent of GNP) 
1984­88 
+ 4.4 
+ 4.6 
+ 6.5 
+ 3.5 
­3.9 
­2.9 
1989 
+ 2.8 
+ 2.2 
+ 2.7 
+ 4.5 
­1.7 
­1.9 
1990 
+ 1.0 
+ 0.5 
-0.1 
+ 5.0 
-2 .4 
-1.8 
1991 1 
+ 0.1 
­0.5 
­3.1 
+ 4.5 
­1.8 
­0.3 
1992 1 
+ 1.6 
+ 1.4 
+ 5.7 
+ 4.9 
-2 .4 
-0.9 
1 Forecast 
2 General government 
1.2. Central and Eastern Europe 
To integrate their countries in the world economy, the 
new democratically elected governments in Central and 
Eastern Europe have initiated comprehensive reform 
programs. The boldness and frontloaded nature of these 
reforms make the beginning of the reform process a 
critical phase. While crucial market oriented policies are 
being implemented progressively, the behaviour of 
economic agents is adapting only gradually to the new 
environment and production is severely constrained as 
much of the obsolescence of the capital stock was brought 
out under exposure to world market prices. In these 
circumstances it is inevitable that output would decline at 
the initial stage. 
Moreover, the necessary restructuring has to take place in 
a rather unfavourable environment: most countries face 
large domestic and external imbalances accumulated over 
years, while at the same time the system of mutual trade in 
the framework of the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance has collapsed, entailing a serious terms of 
trade loss for the Central and Eastern European 
countries. These difficulties were compounded by the oil 
price rise and the slowdown of demand in the Western 
world. 
1.3 The fluctuations of the U.S. Dollar 
Besides the loss in demand following the recession in the 
U.S. Community exports to the rest of the world suffered 
in 1990 from a loss of competitiveness resulting from the 
appreciation of the European currencies vis­a­vis the dollar. 
At the end of February 1991, the dollar value of the ECU 
was about 20% higher than the average for 1989. Since 
then, the dollar has recovered most of this loss. The yen 
fluctuated over the same period even more sharply, its 
value in ECU being in August 1990 more than 28% lower 
than in 1989 on average. The value of the yen recovered 
subsequently more than 10 percentage points of this loss. 
The loss in competitiveness was one of the factors behind 
the slowing in exports and consequently in investment 
growth in the Community since 1989. This illustrates that 
despite its internal growth, the Community could not 
avoid a sizable loss of competitiveness to translate into a 
decline in export growth which affected in turn invest­
ment. 
Community export growth (EUR 10 without Germany 
and United Kingdom) declined as a result from 7.3% in 
1989 to 5.4% in 1990 with a further slowing to 4.2% likely 
in 1991. The slowdown was particularly marked in the 
case of Italy, France, Belgium and Luxembourg. Exports 
to markets outside the Community slowed down even 
more sharply and were only partially compensated by 
increased exports to Germany. 
GRAPH 1 : Capacity utilization in manufacturing in % 
100 
95 
90 
85 
80 
/ \UK-
/ \ 
/ ßL^-^<r " ~~ / ^ 
-^_^^m*** E U R '­ "^"""V^  
■ ^ ~ " ^ " N ,^ 
EUR 10 
j a j o j a j o j a j o j a j o j a 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
TABLE 3 : Nominal wages, real wages and real unit labour costs 
(% change) 
1986-88 1989 1990 1991 ! 1992' 
Nominal compensation per employee 
EUR-102 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
EUR-12 
Rea 
EUR-102 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
EUR-12 
EUR-122 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
EUR-12 
+ 6.2 
+ 3.3 
+ 7.9 
+ 6.0 
compensation 
+ 1.9 
+ 2.5 
+ 3.2 
+ 2.2 
Real unit labo 
-1.2 
-0.7 
+0 
-0.9 
+ 6.6 
+ 2.8 
+ 8.9 
+ 6.1 
>er emp 
+ 1.2 
-0.2 
+ 2.8 
+ 1.2 
ur costs 
-1 .3 
-1.6 
+2.6 
-0.7 
1 Forecast 
2 EUR 10 - EUR 12 minus Germany and United Kingd 
+ 7.7 
+ 4.1 
+ 10.9 
+ 7.6 
oyee 
+ 2.4 
+ 1.5 
+ 3.4 
+ 2.4 
+0.5 
-1.2 
+ 3.0 
+ 0.6 
Mil 
+ 6.9 
+ 6.4 
+ 8.5 
+ 7.1 
+ 1.6 
+ 2.8 
+ 1.9 
+ 2.0 
-0.2 
+ 1.0 
+ 1.3 
+ 0.3 
+ 6.3 
+ 5.5 
+ 6.8 
+ 6.2 
+ 1.5 
+ 1.2 
+ 1.6 
+ 1.5 
-0 .5 
+ 0.1 
-2.3 
-0.7 
2: Growth money supply (M2/3) and GDP - EUR 12 
(annual % change) 
* Forecast 
** Deflated by GDP priee-deflator 
///' Change in liquidity ratio 
Despite these large exchange rate fluctuations and the 
liberalisation of capital movements, the EMS has not 
experienced major tensions, although positions of the 
different currencies within the ERM changed over time 
and interest rate differentials were gradually reduced. 
2. A cyclical adjustment within the Community 
To some extent the slowdown of demand was also a 
cyclical phenomenon after the strong recovery in the 
second half of the 1980s. Investment in particular 
expanded markedly during the period 1987-90, by a 
yearly average of more than 7%. Hence some downward 
adjustment was inevitable when external demand 
weakened, spare capacity increased (graph 1) and 
monetary policy was tightened. 
Even if the cyclical downswing in the Community has not 
fundamentally affected its growth potential, the outlook 
for profitability of investment has nonetheless de-
teriorated since 1990: the continuous decline in real unit 
labour costs going on since 1981 (the best proxy for 
company profitability) has come to an end. Profitability 
has no longer been recovering since 1989. The deterio-
ration has been particularly marked in the United 
Kingdom from 1989 to 1991, and is likely in Germany in 
1991. But also in Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Luxembourg the profit improvement of the previous 
years has been halted or reversed. The increase is mainly 
due to high nominal increases in compensation per head, 
above 7% per annum in 1990 and 1991 in the Community 
on average (table 3). 
Policies over recent years have, to some extent, con-
tributed to this development. The liquidity ratio (M2/3 
over nominal GDP) for the Community, although also 
influenced by financial innovation and other structural 
adjustments on money and capital markets, increased 
relatively sharply in 1987 and again in 1989 (graph 2). It is 
therefore at least questionable whether despite rising 
short term interest rates, monetary policy was sufficiently 
consistent with potential growth over the period till 1989, 
as excess liquidity was allowed to build up, thereby 
underpinning the basis for large wage claims. In 1990 
there was a much smaller increase in the liquidity ratio, 
reflecting the tightening of monetary policy in an attempt 
to prevent the oil price rise from feeding into a wage-price 
spiral. 
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3. The Gulf crisis and the fall in confidence 
In addition to the above mentioned factors, the sharp, but 
short lived rise in oil prices resulting from the Gulf crisis 
led to a deterioration in the terms of trade in the 
Community and a decline in real disposable income that 
affected consumption and investment. In the event that 
oil prices had remained high, this would have affected 
member states quite differently. Indeed, while overall 
energy intensity of production has been reduced sizably 
since 1973 in nine Community countries, it has increased 
in Spain and particularly Greece and Portugal owing to 
the transition in those countries to a production structure 
with a greater industrial content. 
The subsequent drop in oil prices to pre­conflict levels 
reversed most of the unfavourable direct income and 
price effects of the higher oil price. The oil price in mid 
April 1991 was at about $ 19 per barrel (spot market price 
for Brent oil) compared to around $ 32 p.b. in the fourth 
quarter of 1990. 
However, the Gulf crisis led to a sharp rise in uncertainty 
in the second half of 1990 and the early part of 1991. 
Confidence was severely eroded among consumers, in 
industry and in construction (see graph 3), with adverse 
repercussions on consumption and investment plans. 
While the main factor responsible for the sharp business 
deterioration, the Gulf conflict, has disappeared, there 
are few signs yet of a re­establishment of a more 
favourable sentiment: according to the first business 
survey after the end of the conflict, only consumers and 
the construction sector seemed to have regained some 
confidence; in industry on the contrary the deterioration 
in sentiment has stopped, but there is as yet no clear sign 
of a revival. A return of confidence in industry is, 
however, crucial for a recovery of investment. 
B. Recession in the United Kingdom 
At its peak in 1988 the rate of expansion of domestic 
demand in the United Kingdom reached about 8%, far in 
excess of the growth in capacity. Induced by this strong 
expansion, inflationary pressures, accommodated ini­
tially by a lax monetary policy, became apparent on the 
price and wage front and in the external account. 
Monetary policy then changed towards an increasingly 
restrictive stance with a progressive increase of short term 
interest rates through the latter part of 1988 and 1989. 
However, the monetary squeeze implemented was slow to 
produce the intended results. Inflation has been per­
sistent, influencing in turn wage settlements. The highly 
restrictive monetary policy resulted in a steep drop in 
activity from the second half of 1990 on. GDP growth 
slowed to 0.6% in 1990 and a sharp decline in output of 
some 2% is expected in 1991, mainly asa result of a sharp 
fall of investment (­10 3/4% in 1991) and a decline in 
private consumption (­1 3/4% in 1991). Despite this 
slowdown in activity, nominal wage trends have remained 
strong, rising by 1014% in 1990 and likely to slow only to 
8'/2% in 1991. In 1992, output is expected to pick up 
again. 
The current account deficit reached a peak in 1989 at 
4.8% of GDP and improved markedly toa deficit of 2.3% 
in 1990 and a forecast of about 1% in 1991 as imports 
weaken in line with falling domestic demand. 
C. German unification 
In contrast to the rest of the Community, economic 
activity accelerated further in Germany as a result of the 
tax reform, unification and the ensuing expansionary 
impulse of fiscal policy. Real GDP growth accelerated 
from 3.3% in 1989 to 4.7% in 1990 (for data on Germany, 
see box). Particularly private consumption, was stimu­
lated while also investment witnessed a strong expansion. 
Statistical problems for Germany 
All the data on Germany in this year's Annual 
Economic Report relate to West Germany. Due to 
major statistical problems it is not yet possible to 
present reliable data for the whole of Germany. Of 
course, the data on the budget deficit reflect the 
transfers from West to East Germany, while also 
the current account data incorporate these trans­
fers. 
The high level of activity led to a strong increase in 
employment in 1990 and 1991 and a resulting sharp drop 
in the unemployment rate from 6.1% in 1988 to 4.5% in 
1991 (harmonized definition of the Statistical Office of 
the EC). The tightening of the labour market has, 
however, also resulted in increased wage demands that 
put an end to the continuous decline in real unit labour 
costs. The expansion of domestic demand and deliveries 
to the Eastern part of Germany could not be met by 
domestic supply, resulting in sharply increased imports. 
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The abrupt integration of the centrally planned GDR 
economy into a market system as a result of unification, 
implied a fast and steep adjustment of the East German 
economy entailing a substantial cost to bridge the 
transition period. The cost of unification would swell the 
fiscal deficit from a small surplus in 1989 to a deficit of 
around 2.2% of GDP in 1990 and around 4.7% in 1991 
despite sizable increases in taxes. 
The massive transfers to East-Germany also resulted in a 
swing in the current account from a large surplus in 1989 
into presumably a small deficit in 1991. 
The developments in the West contrast sharply with those 
in East Germany which undergoes a dramatic adjustment 
process: a fall of 50% in industrial production and 
underemployment amounting to some 35% of the labour 
force (including short-time workers) is expected by the 
end of 1991. Output is generally acknowledged to be 
falling by two-digit figures both in 1990 and 1991 as new 
investment and the creation of working places is not yet 
sufficient to offset the loss of output and employment in 
the old industries. A slight recovery is expected in 1992 
with the help of growth in investment as well in equipment 
as in construction. 
D. Inflation and employment 
Inflation has been relatively well contained since the start 
of the Gulf crisis. Although higher oil prices did push up 
rates of consumer price increases between August and 
October 1990, there are few signs that they have become 
embedded in the ongoing wage and inflation process. So 
far monetary policy seems to have succeeded in prevent-
ing the creation of a wage-price spiral. Indeed consumer 
price inflation is even subsiding: the average rate of 
consumer price inflation in the Community, which 
peaked in October 1990 at 6.3% was down to 5.3% in 
March 1991. 
Still at 5% for the year 1991, the expected average rate of 
inflation in the Community is worryingly high for a 
period of slowing growth. With lower oil prices such a 
level could indicate underlying cost push pressures (graph 
4). Also worrying from the point of view of EMU is that 
between 1988 and 1990 price developments diverged 
within the Community (graph 5). 
Employment growth has lagged the slowdown in activity 
resulting in a cyclical slowing of productivity (see graph 
6). Employment continued to grow in 1990 at the same 
rate as in 1989 (1.6%). The growth was particularly 
strong in Germany, reflecting partly an increased 
availability of skilled labour from East Germany and 
Eastern Europe. But also in the other Community 
countries, with the exception of Greece, the United 
Kingdom and Denmark, employment growth was robust. 
In 1991, employment growth in the Community is 
expected to slow down to 0.2%. This small increase in 
employment will however be largely offset by the 
expected increase in the labour force. The continued fall 
in the unemployment rate since 1986 is expected to be 
reversed and increased from 8.2% in 1990 to 8.7% in 
1991. 
II. The outlook for 1991 and 1992 
At the end of the first quarter of 1991 the main factors 
that underlie the present downswing have either disap-
peared or turned around: the Gulf crisis has been 
resolved, oil prices have returned to their pre-conflict 
levels, economic activity in the United States is expected 
to recover in the second half of the year, the dollar has 
reversed its downward trend and confidence is gradually 
being restored. 
The fundamentally healthy underlying growth conditions 
in the Community should therefore reassert themselves. 
The decline in real growth is expected to bottom out 
during the course of the year so that activity would 
gradually recover in the second half of the year: real GDP 
growth would increase from 1 ]A% in 1991 to 2lA% in 
1992 mainly under the influence of a pick­up in consumer 
demand and investment. 
A. The risk factors 
These relatively favourable expectations hinge crucially 
on a recovery of the consumer and business climate. Any 
delay in recouping the erosion of confidence could 
weaken the economic performance of the Community. 
With consumer optimism restored and real incomes 
basically unaffected and even slightly increasing, con­
sumer demand should gradually pick up. 
The recovery of investment in 1992 partly relies on the 
assumption that the deterioration in the wage situation 
was only temporary and that per capita real wage 
increases will come down again from 2 '4% on average 
between 1986­91 to VA% in 1992. If such a development 
were not to materialize, profitability would not improve 
for the third consecutive year for the Community as a 
whole, which would depress expectations for investment. 
A further weakening of economic activity in combination 
with a continued fall in profits might further deteriorate 
the situation. 
Another risk factor is the instability of the US dollar. The 
dollar's behaviour has been very volatile over recent 
years. Although a further decline now seems less likely, it 
can still not be excluded if the expected US recovery does 
not establish itself in 1991. But also a strong upward shift 
in the value of the dollar would not be without adverse 
consequences for the Community: although this would 
improve competitiveness, it would also considerably 
strengthen inflationary impulses through higher import 
prices from outside the Community. 
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Β. The policy concerns 
The still ongoing cooling­off does not require any 
significant change of policies. Against the background of 
continuing positive growth fundamentals, forces are 
gradually taking shape that should lead to an early 
recovery of activity: the increase in household income, 
the downward tendency of long term interest rates, lean 
inventories during the course of 1991 are all factors 
pointing to an imminent re­acceleration of growth. There 
are a few areas though where developments are less 
satisfactory and further progress would be warranted. 
1. Profitability, growth and employment 
The improvement in growth fundamentals during the 
1980s was not brought about spontaneously but was a 
result of a consistent set of policies aiming at revigourat­
ing the European growth performance aided by a 
relatively favourable international environment. Besides 
sustained demand expectations, wage developments will 
play a critical role to bring about the economic recovery. 
Continued wage moderation is an important condition to 
strengthen employment­creating investment and is 
needed to make new inroads in the still high unemploy­
ment rate. 
The relatively unfavourable recent wage developments 
have not yet seriously affected the medium­term outlook 
for profits in the Community. Profitability had improved 
considerably during the 1980s and the recent deterio­
ration has not changed that picture fundamentally. The 
net return on the capital stock had, however, not yet 
recovered its average level of the period 1961­73, because 
more capital is now employed per unit of output (see 
graph 7). A further increase in the investment ratio would 
be welcome in view of the still high level of unemploy­
ment. This would require the re­establishment of 
unambiguous expectations on a further improvement of 
the level of profitability. 
Wage moderation is an essential prerequisite to stimulate 
employment­creating investment. Increases in real wages 
must remain below increases in total factor productivity 
so as to avoid switches to more capital intensive forms of 
production and further improve the employment content 
of growth. Indeed, the unemployment rate, at 8.2% in 
1990, remains unacceptably high and will increase again 
in 1991 and 1992. It needs to be further lowered. The 
intensification of wage pressures in the presence of such 
high levels of unemployment seem to suggest rigidities in 
the functioning of the labour market. 
While the outlook for 1991 is not yet a matter of concern, 
the large wage increases granted in Germany constitute a 
potential threat. They risk undermining price stability in 
the country that had the best price performance of EMS 
countries in the past and whose currency therefore served 
as an anchor. Moreover, if these increases were to spread 
to neighbouring countries the situation could become 
really disturbing and create a cost push inflation. The 
situation is the more worrying as there could be a 
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tendency for such higher increases in wages to be more 
readily accepted in these countries since they would not 
erode external competitiveness. They could erode, 
however, profitability and could thereby undermine the 
growth, investment and employment potential of the 
economy. 
The wage situation in the United Kingdom, is also still not 
satisfactory although some improvement is expected in 
1991 and 1992. Membership of the ERM is providing the 
framework for a more rational setting of wages. 
Also in Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain expected wage 
developments, while not threatening profitability, are 
nonetheless not yet conducive to a better nominal 
convergence. In the other Community countries, there 
seems to be less reason for concern in as far as the 
assumed wage behaviour will be validated. 
2. Inflation III. Policy Conclusions 
Moderate wage developments are not only important to 
improve the employment situation, but also for better 
nominal convergence within the Community. Together 
with wage developments, the inflation performance has to 
be carefully monitored. While an improved convergence 
of consumer price levels is expected, regrettably this is at a 
higher level of inflation mainly as a result of the 
deterioration in the price performance in Germany. From 
the point of view of the required nominal convergence in 
EMU, the situation is not satisfactory. 
3. Budgetary convergence 
Not only in the field of prices is there a lack of improved 
convergence, also in the budgetary area, there has been no 
further progress since 1989. The process of budgetary 
consolidation that began in most countries around 1983 
has come to a standstill. In fact much of the improvement 
registered over the last years seems to be mainly due to the 
favourable cyclical situation and may even imply a 
structural deterioration of budget balances (see graph 8). 
For the Community as a whole, net borrowing is 
estimated to increase from 3% of GDP in 1989 to 4% in 
1990 and 4.5% in 1991. Hence there is a clear need to 
strengthen the budgetary consolidation efforts in most 
countries. 
4. Inadequacy of saving 
Recent budgetary trends in the Community are not only 
disquieting in light of the desired convergence towards 
EMU, but also in a context of growing scarcity of capital 
in the world economy, which has been exacerbated 
through the opening of Eastern European countries. Over 
and above that, the major industrial countries have 
increased their drawing on net savings from the rest of the 
world in recent years, mainly as a result of the reduction 
of the excess saving supply from Japan and particularly 
Germany (graph 9). Private saving remained fairly stable 
during the 1980s, the decline in household saving being 
compensated by an increase in corporate saving. The 
single most important factor behind the decline in 
industrial country savings is the excessive government 
budget deficits in the major countries. A failure to redress 
their situation would not only reduce the domestic growth 
potential of these countries, but also jeopardize efforts to 
reverse the unsustainable and undesirable net resource 
flow from developing to industrial countries that has 
persisted during the 1980s. 
A global shortfall of savings could translate in a 
continued and significant tightening of global capital 
markets, with very high long-term interest rates. In this 
context it should not be forgotten that the reduction in 
investment demand in 1990 and 1991 has allowed the 
public sector to absorb a larger share of savings so far 
without undue further pressure on real interest rates. In 
these conditions real long-term interest rates may remain 
high, and could even rise again if investment demand were 
to recover strongly. 
To sustain economic growth and employment, the 
Community will have to rely more on its own potential. A 
climate of stability is an essential prerequisite for its 
development. Therefore the Community will have to 
maintain prudent and balanced monetary and fiscal 
policies. These policies will at the same time help to 
preserve the favourable growth fundamentals. The 
completion of the internal market, the continued 
implementation of structural policies and further im-
provements in economic and social cohesion and in the 
environment will in turn strengthen the Community's 
potential. 
The deterioration in short-term growth prospects in the 
Community does not alter the fundamental positive 
assessment of the underlying potential of the Community 
economy. Provided appropriate policies are followed, 
confidence should pick up again and investment activity 
could resume its strong growth leading to renewed 
significant job creation. 
To meet the challenges it is all the more important that 
policy coordination is strengthened in accordance with 
the decision on multilateral surveillance for Stage One. 
Multilateral surveillance is covering a wide range of 
macroeconomic and structural policies to ensure conver-
gence of economic policies and performances in the 
member states with the aim of maintaining or improving 
the conditions for a sustainable, employment creating 
growth. 
A. Maintain stability and growth climate 
Monetary policy will have to remain vigilant to quell 
inflationary pressures. The divergent cyclical positions of 
the member countries and the steadying of exchange rate 
expectations have provided some scope for reducing 
interest rate differentials without undermining the 
exchange rate commitment. In the absence of a common 
monetary policy during the transition to the final stage of 
EMU, however, monetary policy will have to be geared as 
well to the domestic price situation as to exchange rate 
considerations. Unless inflationary pressures subside 
clearly and in the absence of greater support from fiscal 
policy there is no room for a relaxation of monetary 
policy in the Community. 
Fiscal policy needs further tightening not only with a view 
to better convergence in Stage I of EMU, but also as a 
contribution to increasing global savings and relieving the 
pressure on monetary policy. With budgetary revenues 
less forthcoming and outlays on unemployment increas-
ing, some deterioration of budget balances seems 
inevitable in 1991 as a result of automatic stabilisers. To 
further the process of consolidation, however, it would 
seem appropriate that the cyclical deterioration of the 
budget position would only partly be reflected in the total 
budget balance so that structural improvement would be 
resumed. The rules aimed at limiting public sector deficits 
and indebtedness, which the Community is in the process 
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of defining in the framework of the Intergovernmental 
Conference, could be an important contribution for 
sound medium-term budget balances. As a matter of fact 
already now, during the transition period, these rules 
should serve as an informal guideline to assess budget 
balances to ensure that sufficient progress would be 
achieved in Stage One. 
Rising wage pressure in a context of a still high level of 
unemployment points to the need for more fundamental 
structural reform in labour markets to strengthen employ-
ment creating investment. There seems to be a good case 
for encouraging a more active labour market policy with 
greater emphasis on retraining than on provision of 
unemployment support. Further obstacles to employ-
ment creation should be removed and wage setting 
procedures should allow a fuller reflection of differences 
in productivity so as to improve adjustment of demand 
and supply of labour. 
B. The development of Community potential 
The general policies which must be implemented to curb 
the re-emergence of inflationary pressures and inflation 
divergences are also those needed to create the conditions 
for the realization of the great Community projects: 
Economic and Monetary Union, completion of the 
internal market, economic and social cohesion. At the 
same time, these projects complement the policies being 
implemented at the national level. 
1. Complete the internal market 
To secure its economic future, Europe has embarked on a 
programme for creating a market of continental dimen-
sions. One of the main constraints the Community still 
faces on the competitive world stage is the fragmented 
nature of its markets, which makes it difficult to produce 
at optimum levels, holds back technological progress and 
impedes development of the services sector, where growth 
is particularly strong. The opening of the Community 
frontiers will enhance competition. Increased specia-
lization and efficiency of production will greatly improve 
consumer choice. 
TABLE 4: 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1991-1986 
The catching-up process in the Community 
current market prices and purchasing parities 
population (Eurl2 = 100) 
GREECE 
55.9 
54.1 
54.2 
54.0 
52.9 
52.6 
-3 .3 
SPAIN 
72.8 
74.7 
75.7 
76.9 
77.8 
79.2 
+ 6.4 
IRELAND 
63.4 
64.4 
64.7 
67.0 
68.6 
68.7 
+ 5.3 
GDP* at 
per head of 
PORTUGAL 
52.5 
53.7 
53.7 
54.9 
55.6 
57.1 
+ 4.6 
1 * Reference to GDP may overstate progress to the extent that income transfers to abroad 
may have outpaced nominal GDP growth. 
The internal market programme is the decisive driving 
force in adding to E.C. Growth prospects and prosperity. 
Economic operators are increasingly anticipating the 
highly competitive environment which will prevail and 
the new operating conditions and opportunities which 
will exist by 1992. An increasing number of firms have 
begun to operate on greatly enlarged market horizons and 
are actively changing their strategies. In addition to the 
positive growth effects stemming from the abolition of 
internal border controls, and the removal of technical 
barriers to the free movement of goods and services, 
particularly as regards the latter in the financial services 
sector, growth will also be attributable to the positive 
effects arising from the necessary restructuring in 
industrial and services sectors and from positive changes 
in marketing strategies. 
In the single market, an effective Community competition 
policy is essential since measures and practices aimed at 
reducing or avoiding competition (such as increased 
subsidies or market sharing agreements) would reduce 
these positive effects. To crown the achievement of the 
internal market with a single currency in the near future 
would - as recent business surveys show - further bolster 
the positive mood of management. 
The high expectations that have been created must not be 
disappointed. Therefore the deadline of 1st January 1993 
for completing the internal market must be respected. 
Hence, it is essential that the remaining decisions in 
respect of the proposals contained in the 1985 White 
Paper must be taken as soon as possible. Significant 
progress has already been achieved and decisions have 
been taken in all areas of economic activity. The 
Commission has already tabled all the proposals 
contained in the White Paper, and over two thirds have 
been approved by the Council. The Commission is 
turning its attention to the problems of implementation 
(some 72% of the so far required national implementing 
measures have been taken) and to the proper functioning 
of the single market. Decisions have still to be taken in 
important fields relating to the complete removal of 
internal border controls. The Council must give priority 
to these areas (which include the approximation of 
indirect taxation rates) and monitor the situation on a 
regular basis to ensure that decisions are taken such that 
progress towards removing completely the internal 
borders becomes irreversible, as is the case for the rest of 
the programme. Member states ought to accelerate the 
rate of implementation of decisions and to eliminate all 
delays by the end of 1991. 
2. Improve economic and social cohesion 
The improvement of economic and social cohesion will 
also strengthen growth prospects. Above average growth 
in the less favoured countries would contribute to 
expanding the growth potential of the Community 
economy as a whole. 
The strengthening of economic and social cohesion and 
the objective of an harmonious development across 
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European regions have been reaffirmed in article 130 of 
the Single Act. Above-average growth in those countries 
and regions, as has been the case in recent years in Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland, but not in Greece, has started to 
reduce the income gap (table 4) and has expanded the 
growth potential in the Community as a whole. The gap 
remains sizable though, and will require a long-term 
effort of catching-up. 
The economically stronger countries could contribute to 
this process by the maintenance of a dynamic growth 
pattern and the opening of markets to trade. The 
doubling of the structural Funds and the simultaneous 
strengthening of the financial instruments will make 
available to Greece, Portugal and Ireland resources 
equivalent to between 3 and 5% of GDP in 1993. They 
support the considerable improvement in structural 
policies achieved so far. Economic and social policies on 
the national and Community level have to provide the 
basis for a continuous relative growth of real GDP, 
without inflationary pressure and unsustainable internal 
and external imbalances. The catching-up countries will, 
however, remain primarily responsible for their own 
development through the pursuit of appropriate policies. 
3. Structural adjustment 
Structural policies improve the capacity of member states' 
economies to adjust. They enhance flexibility in goods 
and factor markets and should lead to an improvement in 
the extent and speed of response of prices in those markets 
to changes in market conditions. Structural policies 
thereby reduce the potential size and duration of 
adjustment costs associated with disturbances. 
Beyond the internal market program, Member countries 
have engaged in a number of structural improvements to 
be able to cope with increased competition on the unified 
market. So far the major initiatives fell within the 
liberalization of financial markets and the restructuring 
of personal and corporate taxation. 
Governments and the Community have taken initiatives 
to improve the capacity of labour markets to cope with 
change and policies for education and vocational training 
are being given high priority in many member states. They 
are an important instrument for the absorption of the 
long-term unemployed. Structural policy initiatives for 
labour market flexibility will need further emphasis. 
Also in the public sector, structural reform has to be 
carried further so as to improve the efficiency of the public 
sector and to ensure transparent and fair competition 
between private and public enterprises. 
Higher economic efficiency and improved resource 
allocation should not only be sought within the Com-
munity, but also in the world. The Uruguay Round is a 
cooperative effort to promote trade and economic 
growth. As the world's largest trading block, the 
Community has a natural interest in a successful 
conclusion of the Round. It is at the same time an 
instrument to provide a better platform for its weaker 
trading partners, in particular the Central and Eastern 
European and the developing countries. 
TABLE 5: 
EUR-12 
EUR-7 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
France 
Ireland 
Luxemburg 
Netherland 
EUR-3 
Italy 
Spain 
Inflation convergence 
of the 1980s ' 
1986 
+ 3.8 
n the Community 
1989 1990 
+4.9 +5.0 
n the second half 
1991? 
+ 5.0 
Countries with low and converging inflation3 
+ 1.2 
+ 0.5 
+ 2.9 
-0 .2 
+2.9 
'" +4.3 
+ 1.1 
ì +0.2 
+ 3.3 +2.8 
+ 3.5 +3.5 
+ 5.1 +2.6 
+ 3.1 +2.5 
+ 3.5 +3.0 
+ 3.9 +2.6 
+ 3.4 +3.8 
+ 2.9 +2.6 
Countries with high inflation 
+ 5.7 
+ 5.7 
+ 8.6 
United Kingdom +4.4 
EUR-2 
Portugal 
Greece 
+ 6.0 +6.7 
+ 5.8 +6.2 
+ 6.6 +6.4 
+ 5.9 +7.2 
Countries with double-digit inflation 
+ 18.1 
+ 13.8 
+22.1 
+ 13.8 +16.9 
+ 12.8 +13.6 
+ 14.7 +20.5 
+ 3.2 
+ 3.2 
+ 2.4 
+ 3.5 
+ 3.1 
+ 3.0 
+ 3.5 
+ 2.8 
+ 6.3 
+ 6.3 
+ 5.9 
+ 6.5 
+ 14.6 
+ 11.5 
+ 18.0 
1992 2 
+ 4.6 
+ 3.6 
+ 3.6 
+ 2.6 
+ 4.2 
+ 3.2 
+ 3.0 
+ 3.5 
+ 2.9 
+ 5.3 
+ 5.6 
+ 5.3 
+ 5.1 
+ 11.3 
+ 9.8 
+ 13.0 
1 Private consumption deflator 
- Forecast 
3 Countries which registered low and converging inflation rates in the second half of the 
1980s ; they are the countries which participated from the outset in the narrow band of the 
EMS. 
4. The environmental challenge 
Just as the previous oil shocks helped to break the 
parallelism that was perceived in the fifties and sixties 
between economic growth and energy use, there is 
presently a growing awareness, that was given added 
impetus through the Gulf crisis, that the link between 
economic growth and pollution needs to be broken. 
Experience in Eastern European countries, which have a 
much higher level of pollution than the richer Community 
countries, shows, however, that the link is not straightfor-
ward. The Community's better performance is no reason 
for complacency and needs to be substantially improved. 
There does exist, though, a clearer link between the price 
mechanism and pollution. Often market prices do not 
reflect the full environmental cost to society of their 
production or use. Moreover, private economic agents 
are not inclined to take into account the environmental 
effect of their activities, when taking consumption or 
investment decisions. 
At the centre of any comprehensive policy to address the 
pollution problem (beyond the inevitable need for 
regulatory instruments), is therefore the need to inter-
nalize these external environmental effects in order to give 
the right signals to market participants. 
The aim is to transform the patterns of economic growth 
in such a way as to reach a sustainable development path. 
A reinforced policy of environmental protection would 
not necessarily represent a constraint on private business, 
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but could offer significant market opportunities for those 
pioneering environmentally friendly products and pro-
duction processes. 
There is now a broad consensus that more use of economic 
and fiscal instruments should be made in environmental 
policy, but that the optimal policy would still consist of a 
balanced mix of market-based and traditional regulatory 
instruments. The main examples of economic and fiscal 
instruments have been identified as taxes, charges or fiscal 
incentives, deposit refund systems, tradable emission 
permits and financial aid or subsidies. In the case of taxes 
and charges, the impact on the competitive position of the 
Community and the priorities of the internal market 
ought to be given due consideration. 
In view of the importance of the international dimension 
of pollution close international coordination is called for. 
Within the Community there is a need for a minimum of 
harmonization in order to avoid policy instruments being 
in potential conflict with other Community objectives 
and to ensure compatibility of instruments among 
member states when the issue is transnational. 
TABLE 6 : General Government net lending 
(in percent of GDP) 
E. C. 
Greece 
Italy 
Belgium 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Denmark 
Germany 
Spain 
France 
Luxemburg 
1985 1987 1989 
-4 .6 -4 .2 -3.0 
High deficit/high debt counl 
-13.8 -12.4 -19.2 
-12.5 -11.1 -10.1 
High debt countries 
-8 .5 -7.0 -6 .6 
-11.2 -9.1 -3 .5 
-4.8 -6 .6 -5.0 
-10.1 -6.8 -3.4 
Other countries 
-2 .0 +2.4 -0 .5 
+ 1.1 -1.9 +0.2 
-6 .9 -3 .2 -2.7 
-2.9 -1.9 -1.4 
+ 5.3 +1.2 +3.1 
United Kingdom -2.8 -1 .3 +1.0 
+ )or 
1990 
-4.1 
Ties 
-18.9 
-10.6 
-6.0 
-3.4 
-5 .7 
-5.8 
-1 .5 
-2 .2 
-3 .7 
-1 .6 
+4.2 
-0 .5 
borrowing (-) 
1991' 
-4 .6 
-15.4 
-10.0 
-6 .4 
-3.8 
-4 .8 
-5 .5 
-1 .3 
-4.7 
-2 .7 
-1 .6 
+ 1.7 
-2 .2 
19921 
-4 .4 
-10.7 
-10.0 
-6.1 
-3 .5 
-4 .9 
-5.0 
-1.1 
-3 .9 
-2.0 
-1 .5 
+ 1.6 
-3.1 
1 Forecast 
C. Policies for improved convergence 
While the Community has significantly improved its 
economic convergence performance since the beginning 
of the decade, some worrying divergence has emerged 
between 1988 and 1990. Serious problems remain in some 
countries and in some areas. Convergence requirements 
will furthermore be tightened as a result of the multi-
lateral surveillance. The significant progress already 
realised is testimony to the positive effects of the discipline 
imposed by the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. In 
fact, the present convergence positions of Member States 
are closely correlated with their degree of exposure to this 
discipline. 
1. Price and cost convergence 
The degree of price convergence is most marked among 
those countries which have respected the narrow band of 
fluctuation from the outset. The average rate of inflation 
(private consumption deflator) in this group of countries 
has been close to, or below, the three per cent mark since 
1986, although the rate has been rising recently. The 
dispersion in the individual rates of inflation is lower than 
in the 1960s and the gap between the highest (3.8% in 
Luxembourg) and the lowest (2.5% in Denmark) rates of 
inflation for 1990 is just over one point (table 5). 
The price convergence in these countries up to 1990, 
already broadly corresponds to what might be required 
for the transition to the final stage of EMU. This 
convergence in the rate of inflation has been accompanied 
by a clear deceleration in the rates of increase in nominal 
unit labour costs. 
The acceleration of inflation in 1990 and 1991 in these 
countries and particularly in Germany in 1992, cannot be 
TABLE 7: Gross public debt in 
(in percent of GDP) 
Belgium 
Italy 
Ireland 
Greece 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Denmark 
Germany 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
France 
Luxemburg 
EUR-12 
1986 
123.7 
88.4 
115.3 
65.1 
71.7 
68.4 
66.9 
42.7 
48.0 
57.7 
34.1 
13.4 
58.3 
the Community countries 
1989 
128.9 
98.6 
103.8 
82.9 
78.0 
71.2 
62.5 
43.6 
44.6 
45.1 
35.7 
8.5 
58.6 
1990 
127.5 
100.7 
99.8 
86.3 
78.5 
67.3 
62.4 
43.0 
45.2 
43.2 
36.4 
6.3 
58.6 
1991 ! 
128.1 
103.3 
97.4 
86.0 
78.8 
63.8 
62.3 
45.4 
44.5 
44.4 
37.3 
4.7 
60.0 
1992' 
127.8 
105.8 
95.2 
83.3 
79.9 
61.6 
61.7 
47.2 
43.7 
45.6 
37.8 
3.2 
61.0 
1 Forecast. 
considered satisfactory from the point of view of stability 
and needs therefore to be rolled back as soon as possible. 
Particularly since the main source of inflation seems to be 
higher wage costs. 
A second group of countries had in 1990 an inflation rate 
which is still double that of the first group. Italy, which 
belongs to the narrow band, and Spain, which joined the 
wider band in 1989, have also made significant progress 
since the beginning of the 1980s, but they still show a 
much less favourable convergence position. Italy faces 
strong wage pressures with nominal unit labour costs 
rising by more than 9% in 1990 against less than 5% for 
most of the original participants in the narrow-band. 
These countries should gradually improve their inflation 
performance over the next two to three years to the level 
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of the narrow band countries. This will require that the 
claims on resources of the different sectors of the 
economy be made more compatible with each other. 
Setting more ambitious but realistic inflation targets and 
pursuing them by stability oriented monetary and fiscal 
policies may help to create a stability environment and 
may contribute to provide a reference framework for 
wage developments. 
The United Kingdom, which belongs to the wider band of 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism, is experiencing a high 
rate of inflation (more than 7% in 1990 for the deflator of 
private consumption adjusted for the impact of local 
government taxation changes) and a large current 
account deficit (about 214% of GDP in 1990). The 
current recession of the economy will bring some 
improvement on both fronts in 1991 and 1992. The main 
problem for the United Kingdom's economy is the 
excessive increase in wage costs. What is even more 
worrying is that wage settlements are still running at a 
high rate and are only showing limited signs of reacting to 
the slowdown in the economy. The composition of the 
retail price index may also partly explain this develop-
ment. After entry of the pound sterling into the ERM, 
expectations are favourably affected creating a better 
prospect for the United Kingdom to reduce inflation. 
Portugal still has a very high rate of inflation (over 13% in 
1990). Nominal unit labour costs are still growing too 
rapidly (14.5%). A persistent effort will be needed to 
reduce inflation progressively to the level in the narrow-
band. Such an endeavour remains possible as experience 
in other countries has shown. In 1982 and 1983, when 
exchange rate policy in the EMS became tighter, Ireland 
had rates of inflation comparable to that now experienced 
by Portugal. The more flexible exchange rate policy 
implemented since October 1990 and the framework for 
wage moderation recently agreed with the social partners 
should help to put downward pressure on inflation, 
allowing early participation in the ERM. 
The Greek economy is characterized by serious imbal-
ances in many areas, which call for radical measures. The 
rate of inflation exceeded 20% in 1990, and the budget 
deficit has reached unprecedented levels in the Com-
munity, leading to a rapidly rising public debt to GDP 
ratio. A serious adjustment effort is essential, and should 
be sustained over the medium-term. The Greek govern-
ment's medium-term programme proposes significant 
adjustments which are expected to lead to a sizable decline 
in inflation in 1992. 
2. Convergence of budgetary policies 
Convergence must not only be fostered from the cost and 
price side, but public authorities also have to reduce their 
claims on resources, so as to avoid unsustainable 
imbalances, to improve the supply-side of the economy 
and to create room for manoeuvre when adverse 
developments have to be addressed. 
In the budgetary area, progress in convergence has been 
distinctly less marked than for prices and costs. In about 
half the number of Member States the level of the budget 
deficit gives cause for concern. As indicated the process of 
consolidation has come to a standstill. Further progress is 
essential because unsustainable fiscal positions under-
mine over the medium and longer term the credibility of 
the commitment to monetary stability and impair the 
conduct of economic policy. 
A new budgetary problem has emerged in Germany. 
Unification has led to a sizable deterioration in its fiscal 
position. Recent measures adopted in January and 
February 1991 increasing social contributions, income 
taxes and excise duties would provide the State with extra 
revenues amounting to some 1% of GDP in 1991. This 
would result in limiting the public borrowing requirement 
to 4.7% of GDP in 1991 (table 6). Although the use of 
national savings to solve a temporary domestic problem 
can hardly be challenged, the size and abruptness of the 
swing in the federal budget position is from the 
conjunctural point of view not without risks. The strong 
demand from the former GDR, supported by large 
budgetary transfers required to avoid an economic 
breakdown in the new 5 Lander, may strain production 
capacity in West-Germany, putting pressure on inflation 
and appreciating the exchange rate in real terms. To 
guard against these dangers and to avoid an overburden-
ing of monetary policy, a more ambitious tightening of 
the fiscal stance would be appropriate. Moreover greater 
emphasis might be put on reducing expenditures and 
particularly subsidies to regions that are no longer 
peripheral as a result of unification. 
In Greece and Italy progress has been fairly limited. In 
Italy, the fiscal position deteriorated again slightly in 
1990, and shows limited signs of improving despite 
repeated attempts at correction. The necessary reduction 
in the rate of inflation will have to go in tandem with 
significant reductions in budget deficits that allow first a 
stabilization, and then a reduction in the level of debt as a 
percentage of GDP that is now exceeding 100% (table 7). 
A disinflation process not accompanied by an ap-
propriate budgetary adjustment would result in an even 
faster rise in the public debt ratio, as was also the case in 
Belgium in the early and middle eighties. Given the 
unsustainable debt position of Italy, any postponement of 
corrective action only increases the adjustment effort that 
ultimately will have to be carried out, as the snowballing 
interest charges crowd out other expenditures. 
In Greece, the budget deficit, at more than 18% of GDP in 
1990, has led to a rapid increase in the gross public debt 
ratio, from less than 30% of GDP in 1980 to about 86% in 
1990. The adjustment efforts undertaken by the Greek 
Government are expected to result in a sizable reduction 
of the budget deficit this year and next. Sustained efforts 
over several years will be needed, however, before 
sufficient convergence will be achieved. 
Also in Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal the level of 
the budget deficit is worrying for Economic and 
Monetary Union. The public debt ratio is still very high 
15 
and has not yet fully been stabilized. The fiscal deficit 
should be reduced further so as to bring the public debt 
ratio on a clearly declining trend. In Belgium the public 
debt ratio is still excessively high (128% of GDP in 1990). 
The budget deficit is still too large to put the public debt 
ratio on a downward path, if growth slows or interest 
rates rise. The double government norm aiming at 
freezing in real terms non-interest expenditures and at 
keeping constant the deficit in nominal terms, should be 
applied to all levels of government. Only its strict and 
global application will ensure that the public debt ratio 
will be progressively reduced, which is essential to 
guarantee long-term stability. In the Netherlands, the 
public debt ratio, though not as high as in the case of 
Belgium and Ireland, is still not fully stabilized. Some 
tightening of fiscal policy would be warranted. The 
budgetary situation in Portugal also needs to be improved 
in parallel with the disinflation process so as to maintain 
the progress in stabilizing the public debt ratio. 
Ireland has already reduced its budget deficit substan-
tially, so that the public debt ratio is on a clearly declining 
trend. This trend should now be continued. 
In a last group of countries - including Denmark, Spain, 
France, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom - the 
budgetary position in terms of net lending or borrowing 
and public debt seems to be under control and does not 
present the Community with a convergence problem. The 
increase in the budget deficit in the United Kingdom, 
although partly attributable to the recession, nevertheless 
calls for attention. The general assessment does not 
detract, however, from the need, also valid for the other 
countries, to improve the structural features of their 
public finance to benefit the supply-side of the economy, 
to prepare for the single market of 1992 and to increase 
budgetary flexibility as required by a better policy-mix. 
This will particularly involve improving the structure of 
expenditure and receipts, winding down in some cases the 
share of expenditure in GDP and lessening the tax 
burden. 
Moreover, a few of these countries continue to suffer 
from strong inflationary pressures and large external 
deficits, such as the United Kingdom and Spain, or from 
high foreign debt, such as Denmark. Hence, there is a 
need to maintain a cautious budgetary policy in these 
countries. 
3. Convergence of external positions 
In an integrating economy with fully liberalized capital 
movements and increasing exchange rate fixity, conver-
gence of current account balances is to be judged in a 
different context and the appropriateness of current 
account imbalances has to be individually assessed. 
Spain is confronted with a high current account deficit 
(more than 3Vi% of GDP in 1990). A current account 
deficit per se would not be worrying in the Spanish case as 
long as it corresponds to capital imports financing rapid 
growth in productive investment. Such capital imports, 
though, exerted strong upward pressure on the exchange 
rate. What gives cause for concern, however, is the 
rapidity of the deterioration of the current account 
position which was still in equilibrium in 1987. However, 
the deficit is expected to stabilize in 1991 and 1992. If 
exchange rate stability is to be maintained, the rate of 
growth of unit labour costs in Spain must soon be brought 
below that of its main trading partners so as to improve its 
competitive position. This would also create the con-
ditions for the continued strong growth needed both to 
reduce the persistently high levels of unemployment and 
to allow the catching-up process to continue. These 
considerations also apply to Greece where the external 
position has deteriorated sharply in recent years and only 
modest improvement is expected in 1991 and 1992. 
In Italy the external position, while not yet giving cause 
for concern, nevertheless calls for a critical look at wage 
developments to preserve external competitiveness. In the 
United Kingdom some improvement is expected in the 
external position, largely as a result of the drop in 
domestic demand. Still cost developments will need to be 
monitored carefully to avoid a renewed deterioration of 
the current account once domestic demand picks up 
again. 
The current account positions of the initial narrow band 
countries appear broadly sustainable. The German 
external surplus, which had given cause for concern in the 
recent past, is being eliminated from 1991 on as a 
consequence of the unification process. Considerable 
progress has been made in Denmark, where in 1990, for 
the first time since the early sixties, the current account 
has turned into a surplus and is expected to stay so in 1991 
and 1992. This has been achieved, however, at a 
considerable cost in terms of growth. A further improve-
ment in the competitive position, might help to con-
solidate this improvement, at higher levels of activity and 
employment. 
With appropriate monetary, budgetary and structural 
policies, internal inflationary pressures can be absorbed, 
thus preserving the positive fundamental growth con-
ditions of the Community. At the same time, the 
development of the Community potential will improve 
the supply side of the economy and contribute to resume 
its medium-term growth trend. Such policy mix fulfils at 
the same time the requirements for a successful move 
towards Economic and Monetary Union. 
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MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1988­1992 
Community, USA and Japan 
GDP at constant prices ' 
(annual % change) 
(b) 
Β 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
USA 
JAP 
Domestic demand at constant 
1988 
4.1 
­ 1 . 7 
3.8 
7.0 
7.1 
3.8 
0.4 
5.0 
3.6 
1.6 
7.4 
8.0 
5.0 
3.3 
7.3 
(annual % 
1989 
4.9 
0.3 
2.7 
­ 3.3 
7.8 
3.2 
6.0 
3.6 
7.8 
4.9 
4.0 
3.1 
3.7 
2.2 
5.7 
change) 
1990 
3.6 
- 0 . 8 
5.1 
2.5 
4.6 
3.2 
5.5 
1.9 
3.7 
3.8 
5.8 
- 0 . 1 
2.8 
0.5 
5.8 
prices 
1991* 
2% 
VA 
3 
3A 
3 Vi 
l3Á 
\Vl 
2 
4 VA. 
2% 
5 VA. 
­ 3 
Wl 
­Vi 
4 
1992* 
2 Ya 
Wi 
2 Vi 
2 
A VA 
23/* 
1% 
3 
3 VA. 
1 
4 Vi 
2 Vi 
23Á 
Wl 
4 Vi 
(c) 
Β 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
USA 
JAP 
Deflator of private consumption 
(annual % change) 
198« 
1.6 
4.9 
1.3 
14.2 
5.1 
2.9 
2.5 
5.2 
2.8 
0.4 
10.0 
4.9 
3.7 
4.0 
-0 .1 
989 1490 
3.5 
5.1 
3.1 
14.7 
6.6 
3.5 
3.9 
5.8 
3.4 
2.9 
12.8 
5.9 
4.9 
4.5 
1.7 
3.5 
2.6 
2.5 
20.5 
6.4 
3.0 
2.6 
6.2 
3.8 
2.6 
13.6 
7.2 
5.0 
5.0 
2.4 
1991* 
3 VA. 
2 VI 
3 Vi 
18 
6 
3 
3 
6lÁ 
2 VA. 
ììVl 
6 Vi 
4 Vi 
2 VA 
1992* 
3 Vi 
2 Vi 
4 % 
13 
5 Vi 
3% 
3 
5 Vi 
3 Vi 
3 
9VA 
5 
4V* 
5 
2 Vi 
(d) 
Β 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
1 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
USA 
JAP 
Balance on current transactions 
(as a % of GDP) 
1.5 
­ 1 . 2 
4.2 
- 2 . 0 
­ 1 . 1 
- 0 . 3 
1.7 
­ 0 . 8 
33.5 
2.5 
­ 4 . 4 
- 4 . 6 
0.1 
­ 2 . 5 
2.8 
I9S9 1990 
1.1 
­ 1 . 2 
4.7 
-4 .8 
-3 .2 
-0 .1 
1.3 
- 1 .4 
34.4 
3.3 
­ 2 . 9 
- 4 . 8 
-0 .1 
­ 1 . 9 
2.1 
0.7 
0.8 
3.0 
­ 5 . 7 
­ 3 . 5 
­ 1 . 0 
2.7 
­ 1 . 4 
29.3 
4.0 
- 0 . 1 
­ 2 . 3 
- 0 .2 
­ 1 . 8 
1.2 
1991* 
1 
Wl 
0 
- 5 
- 3 
-VA. 
2 VA. 
-WA. 
26 VI 
­VI 
­VA 
1 
1992* 
1 
2 Vi 
-ν* 
­4 
-3 VA 
l3Á 
­Wl 
24 VA. 
4 
­2VA 
­WA­
3A 
- 1 
1 
(e) 
Β 
I)K 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
USA 
JAP 
Number of unemployed as % of 
the civilian labour force 
iw 1990 1991' 1992* 
10.0 
6.5 
6.1 
7.6 
19.3 
9.9 
17.4 
10.8 
2.1 
9.3 
5.6 
8.5 
9.7 
5.5 
2.5 
8.5 
7.7 
5.5 
7.5 
17.1 
9.4 
16.0 
10.7 
1.8 
8.7 
4.8 
7.0 
8.9 
5.3 
2.3 
8.1 
8.6 
5.1 
7.5 
16.1 
9.0 
15.1 
9.8 
1.7 
8.1 
4.6 
5.7 
8.2 
5.4 
2.1 
%Vi 
9 
4Vi 
83Λ 
16 
9 VA 
16 
9 VA 
Wl 
7'% 
43/4 
S Vi 
S VA 
6 Vi 
2 VA 
SV* 
83/4 
43 /4 
9' /4 
1514 
9 Vi 
163/4 
9 Vi 
Wl 
IVA 
5 VA 
103/4 
9 VA 
6 VI 
2 VA 
(0 
Β 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
USA 
JAP 
General government lending 
and borrowing (as a % of GDP) 
1988 
- 6 . 6 
0.5 
- 2 . 1 
­ 1 5 . 5 
- 3 . 3 
- 1 . 8 
- 5 . 2 
­ 1 0 . 9 
2.1 
- 5 . 2 
- 5 . 4 
1.1 
3.7 
- 2 . 0 
2.1 
1989 
­ 6 . 7 
­ 0 . 5 
0.2 
­ 1 9 . 2 
­ 2 . 7 
­ 1 . 2 
­ 3 . 5 
­10 .1 
3.3 
- 5 . 0 
- 3 . 4 
1.0 
­ 2 . 9 
- 1 . 7 
1.8 
1990 
- 6 . 0 
- 1 . 5 
- 2 . 2 
­ 1 8 . 9 
- 3 . 7 
- 1 . 6 
- 3 . 4 
­ 1 0 . 6 
4.2 
- 5 . 7 
- 5 . 8 
- 0 . 5 
- 4 . 1 
- 2 . 4 
2.2 
1991* 
­6% 
­WA 
- 4 % 
­l5Vi 
­23Á 
­Wi 
­33A 
­ 1 0 
1% 
- 4 3 / i 
­5Vi 
­2VA 
­4VI 
­WA 
WA 
1992* 
­ 6 
- 1 
- 4 
- 1 0 3 / 4 
­ 2 
­Wi 
­3Vi 
­ 1 0 
Wl 
- 5 
- 5 
­3 VA 
­4VI 
­2Vi 
2 
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(g) Total employment 
(annual % change) 
Β 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
USA 
JAP 
19SX 1989 1990 
1.5 
0.0 
0.8 
1.6 
3.5 
0.7 
0.4 
0.9 
3.1 
1.4 
0.1 
3.3 
1.6 
2.8 
1.6 
1.1 
-0.6 
1.4 
1.5 
3.6 
1.2 
-0.1 
0.2 
4.0 
1.6 
1.0 
2.8 
1.6 
2.3 
1.9 
1.0 
-0.7 
2.8 
0.4 
2.6 
1.2 
2.1 
1.4 
2.4 
1.9 
2.5 
0.6 
1.6 
0.4 
2.0 
l3/4 
Wi 
Vi 
VA 
VI 
VA 
1 
1 
-2Vi 
VA. 
- 1 
Wl 
1992* 
VA 
VA 
0 
l3/4 
Vi 
Vi 
Vi 
Wl 
Vi 
Vi 
1 
Wl 
(li) Real compensation of employees per head 
(annual % change) (2) 
Β 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
USA 
JAP 
0.8 
-0.9 
1.7 
3.7 
1.1 
1.2 
2.9 
4.0 
0.5 
1.1 
3.1 
2.9 
2.1 
1.9 
3.4 
19S9 
0.6 
-1.6 
-0.2 
4.1 
-0.5 
1.2 
2.2 
3.1 
3.0 
-2.4 
0.8 
2.8 
1.2 
-0.7 
2.2 
1990 1991' 
2.3 
1.0 
1.5 
0.6 
1.2 
3.0 
3.9 
1.8 
1.6 
3.7 
3.4 
2.4 
-0.1 
1.7 
2Vi 
1 
23/4 
3y4 
l3/4 
2Vi 
2 
5 VA 
2 
0 
l VA 
1992* 
2 Vi 
1 
m 
-VA. 
1 
1 
2 Vi 
2 
2 VA. 
l VA-
4 VA-
IV* 
Wi 
Vi 
Wi 
(i) 
B 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
Investment 
198S 
15.0 
- 3 . 1 
4.7 
7.6 
12.6 
6.2 
- 0 . 7 
3.7 
9.9 
11.8 
10.1 
6.1 
6.4 
in construction at constant 
(annual % 
1989 
9.6 
- 4 . 6 
5.1 
2.1 
14.9 
6.6 
9.8 
3.9 
8.8 
2.6 
3.5 
- 0 . 5 
5.3 
change) 
1990 
5.7 
- 3 . 8 
5.2 
0.7 
10.7 
2.3 
8.4 
2.5 
5.9 
2.5 
6.5 
0.1 
3.8 
prices 
1991* 
- I 
-3 
3 Vi 
0 
6 Vi 
l VA 
l VI 
VA 
5 VI 
-VA 
6 VA 
- 3 VA 
Wl 
1992* 
3 
VA 
2 
4 
7 Vi 
2 Vi 
3 
2 Vi 
4 Vi 
Vi 
6 
2 
3 
0') 
Β 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
Investment 
198X 
17.7 
- 7 . 5 
7.7 
10.8 
16.5 
8.9 
5.6 
6.4 
- 5 . 4 
6.8 
23.2 
17.7 
10.4 
in equipment at constant 
(annual % change) 
1989 
19.0 
6.6 
9.8 
17.3 
12.1 
8.1 
14.1 
5.2 
14.9 
5.5 
7.7 
8.4 
8.6 
1990 
9.9 
2.3 
12.9 
10.4 
1.2 
5.3 
6.8 
3.5 
5.6 
6.0 
8.5 
- 3 . 7 
4.7 
prices 
1991* 
3Vi 
-WA 
i3A 
6 
2Vi 
1 
3 % 
IVi 
6 Vi 
23/4 
5y4 
-17 
V* 
1992* 
4 
43/4 
53/4 
10 
53/4 
2 Vi 
4 Vi 
5V4 
53/4 
Vi 
5 Vi 
3 Vi 
4 Vi 
(k) 
Β 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
USA 
JAP 
Gross fixed capital formation at 
constant prices 
(annual % change) 
1988 1989 1990 1991" 
* Based on the forecasts of May 1991. 
1 GNP for USA and Japan from 1989 onwards. 
2 Deflated by the deflator of private consumption. 
Source: Commission services. 
1992* 
13.5 
-6.6 
5.1 
8.8 
14.0 
8.5 
4.6 
6.7 
-5.5 
9.4 
15.0 
14.8 
9.0 
5.0 
12.6 
13.6 
0.2 
7.1 
8.6 
13.7 
5.8 
11.3 
5.1 
13.4 
3.0 
7.5 
4.8 
6.7 
2.7 
11.0 
7.6 
- 1 . 0 
8.8 
5.2 
6.7 
4.0 
7.5 
3.0 
5.8 
4.1 
7.5 
- 1 . 9 
4.3 
- 0 . 1 
10.8 
1 
- 2 Vi 
6 
3 
5 
IVi 
23/4 
1 
53/4 
IVi 
5 Vi 
- 1 0 Vi 
3/4 
0.3 
5 
3Vi 
2 VA, 
4 
7 
63A 
2Vi 
3 3A 
4 
5 
Vi 
5% 
2 VA. 
3 VA. 
5 3A 
6'A 
(D 
Β 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
USA 
JAP 
GDP per head (EC = 100) at current 
prices and current PPS 
(annual % change) 
1 9NS 
95.4 
118.3 
117.9 
38.6 
60.3 
105.8 
60.8 
86.5 
158.5 
118.6 
38.7 
128.6 
100.0 
189.6 
55.8 
I9S9 1990 
101.2 
113.1 
111.1 
56.8 
79.0 
110.4 
58.9 
93.3 
141.9 
113.1 
56.4 
108.5 
100.0 
161.6 
96.3 
100.6 
117.0 
114.0 
55.9 
72.8 
110.1 
63.4 
103.0 
126.2 
106.0 
52.5 
105.4 
100.0 
155.7 
110.7 
1991* 
104.4 
108.5 
113.8 
52.5 
79.3 
108.9 
68.9 
103.6 
133.0 
103.9 
56.7 
101.3 
100.0 
147.3 
121.7 
1992* 
105.1 
108.9 
112.3 
52.3 
80.5 
109.1 
69.0 
104.0 
134.9 
103.3 
57.1 
101.3 
100.0 
145.6 
124.0 
— end of report 
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T A B L E A . l : Indus t r i a l 
Β 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EUR 12 
USA 
J A P 
1986 
0,8 
6,5 
2,4 
­0,2 
3.1 
0,9 
2.2 
4.1 
2.1 
0.2 
7,2 
2,4 
2,4 
2.9 
­0,2 
1987 
2,1 
­3,4 
0,3 
­1,7 
4,6 
1,9 
8,9 
2,6 
­0,9 
0,9 
4,4 
3,3 
2,0 
6,1 
3,0 
¡ reduc t ion (a) — 
1988 
5,8 
1,9 
3,7 
5,7 
3,1 
4,6 
10,7 
6,9 
8,7 
0,2 
3,8 
3,6 
4,3 
5,8 
9,8 
1989 
3,4 
2,3 
5,3 
1,6 
4,5 
4,1 
11,6 
3,9 
7,8 
5,0 
6,7 
0.3 
3,7 
2,9 
6,1 
T A B L E A . 2 : U n e m p l o y m e n t rate — Ν 
Β 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EUR 12 
USA (g) 
J A P (g) 
1986 
11,6 
5,6 
6,3 
7.4 
21.1 
10,3 
18,2 
10,5 
2.6 
10,2 
8,2 
11.4 
10,7 
7,0 
2.S 
1987 
11,4 
5.7 
6.2 
7.4 
20,4 
10,4 
18,0 
10.2 
2,6 
10,0 
6.8 
10.4 
10,3 
6.2 
2,8 
T A B L E A . 3 : C o n s u m e r 
B 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL (h) 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EUR 12 
USA 
J A P 
19X6 
1,3 
3,7 
­0,1 
23,0 
8,8 
2.7 
3.S 
5.8 
0,3 
0.2 
11.7 
3,4 
3,5 
1,9 
0,6 
19S7 
1,6 
4.0 
0.2 
16.4 
5.3 
3,1 
3,1 
4.7 
­0,1 
­0,4 
9,4 
4.1 
3,2 
3.7 
0,1 
1988 
10,0 
6,5 
6.1 
7,6 
19,3 
9.9 
17.4 
10,8 
2,1 
9,3 
5,6 
8,5 
9.7 
5,5 
2,5 
1989 
8,5 
7.7 
5.5 
7,5 
17,1 
9.4 
16,0 
10.7 
1,8 
8,7 
4.S 
7,0 
8,9 
5.3 
2,3 
pr ice index — 
1988 
1,2 
4,5 
1,3 
13,5 
4.8 
2,7 
2,2 
5.1 
1.4 
0,9 
9,6 
4,9 
3,6 
4.1 
0,7 
1989 
3,1 
4.8 
2.8 
13,7 
6,8 
3,6 
4,1 
6.2 
3.4 
1.1 
12,6 
7.8 
5,2 
4.X 
2,3 
­ P e r c e n t a g e ch 
1990 
5,1 
0,5 
5,1 
­1,9 
0,0 
1,3 
4,7 
­0,8 
­0,5 
2,6 
9,1 
­0,7 
1,7 
0.9 
4,7 
1 
5,7 
3,7 
1,8 
­0,7 
2,9 
­0,5 
­0,1 
­2,5 
­1,7 
­5,5 
1,9 
­0,3 
0.1 
0,4 
0,8 
a n g e o n p r e c e d i n g pr. 
1990 
11 
­1,2 
­5,8 
­0,1 
­1,3 
­2,3 
0,8 
­0,6 
­0,5 
2,5 
3.1 
2,7 
1.9 
0,1 
0,9 
1,9 
a m b e r o f u n e m p l o y e d 
1990 
8.1 
7,9 
5.1 
7,5 
16,1 
9,0 
15,6 
9.X 
1,6 
8,1 
4,6 
6,4 
8,4 
5.5 
2,1 
' e r c e n t i 
1990 
3.4 
2,6 
2.7 
20,4 
6,7 
3,4 
3.3 
6.5 
3.7 
2,4 
13,4 
9,5 
5,6 
5.4 
3,1 
I 
8,1 
7,6 
5,3 
16,3 
X.9 
15.5 
10.0 
1,7 
8,3 
4,6 
6,3 
8,4 
5.3 
2.1 
1990 
II 
8,0 
7,9 
5.2 
16,1 
8,9 
15,4 
9.X 
1.6 
X.2 
4.6 
6,2 
X.3 
5.3 
2,1 
ige c h a n g e o n 
I 
0,8 
­0,2 
1,1 
3,5 
1,8 
0.6 
1.0 
2.1 
1,3 
0,3 
4,6 
1,8 
1.4 
1,7 
0,2 
1990 
II 
0,7 
0,8 
0,5 
7,1 
0,8 
0,9 
0,3 
1.3 
0,3 
0,9 
3.2 
4,7 
1,7 
1,0 
1,4 
III 
­1,4 
1,8 
2,2 
­3,9 
­0,7 
0,6 
5,1 
0,4 
1,4 
2,0 
2,8 
­3,3 
0,3 
0,8 
2,4 
IV 
0,5 
0,6 
1,7 
4,7 
­0,4 
­1,0 
­1,2 
­2,1 
­4,1 
2,0 
1,4 
1.6 
­0/2 
­1,9 
1.7 
as p e r c e n t a g e 
III 
8,2 
8,2 
5,1 
15.9 
9,0 
15,6 
9,9 
1,6 
4,6 
6,4 
8,3 
5,6 
2,1 
j r eced 
111 
1,1 
0,7 
0,4 
3,8 
2,2 
1.0 
0,8 
1.4 
0.6 
o.x 2,5 
1,6 
1,2 
1.7 
0,4 
IV 
8,3 
8,1 
4,8 
16,2 
9,0 
15,7 
9,7 
1,7 
4.5 
6,7 
8,3 
5.9 
2,1 
r iod (s.a 
1991 
1 
-0,1 0,8 
­1,2 
0,2 
0,5 
1,4 
­0,1 
(0,2) 
­2,6 
­0,2 
·) 
Sept. 
4,8 
­6,9 
0,7 
­11,5 
­1,3 
­1,7 
1,3 
1,0 
2,7 
4,5 
2,0 
­0,1 
­0,1 
0,1 
­1,0 
o f c ivi l ian labe 
1991 
I 
8,4 
8,0 
4,6 
15,9 
9,2 
16,4 
9,6 
1,6 
4,3 
7.5 
8,4 
6,5 
2,1 
n g p e r i o d 
IV 
1,2 
0.9 
0,9 
6.6 
1.8 
1.0 
0,6 
1.9 
2,0 
0,9 
3,0 
1,6 
1,4 
1,6 
1,7 
1991 
1 
0,6 
0,0 
0,8 
2,1 
1,3 
0,5 
0,8 
(1,7) 
0,3 
0,2 
3,1 
0,6 
(0,9) 
0,8 
0,5 
Sept. 
8,2 
8,1 
5,0 
15,9 
9,0 
15,7 
10,0 
1,6 
4,5 
6,4 
8,3 
5,7 
2,2 
Oct. 
0,7 
0,2 
0,7 
2,4 
0,9 
0,5 
(0,2) 
0,8 
1,1 
0,4 
1,1 
0,8 
0,7 
0,6 
1,3 
1990 
Oct. 
­2,2 
6,7 
2,1 
18,3 
0,2 
0,7 
­4,5 
­3,1 
­5,8 
­3,7 
1,1 
0,1 
0,1 
­0,4 
3,1 
Nov. 
1,5 
1,2 
­1,0 
­4,3 
2,5 
­1,4 
1,3 
­0,9 
0,9 
1,2 
­0,1 
­1,7 
­0,6 
" ­1,7 
­0,8 
ur force (s.a.) 
1990 
Oct. 
8,2 
8,3 
4,9 
16,4 
9,0 
15,6 
9,6 
1,7 
4,5 
6.5 
8.3 
5,7 
2,2 
1990 
Nov. 
­0,4 
­0,1 
­0,2 
1,4 
­0,1 
­0,2 
(0,2) 
0,6 
0,4 
­0,1 
0,7 
­0,2 
0,0 
0,2 
­0,4 
Nov. 
8,3 
8,0 
4,8 
16,2 
9,0 
15,8 
9,6 
1,7 
4,4 
6,7 
8,3 
5,9 
2,1 
Dec. 
­0,1 
­0,3 
0,1 
1,7 
0,2 
­0,1 
(0,3) 
0,2 
0,0 
­0,2 
0,8 
­0,1 
0,1 
0,0 
­0,3 
Dec. 
­1,9 
­6,9 
­0,6 
0,8 
­4,5 
­1,0 
2,6 
1,8 
0,8 
5,1 
­1,2 
­0,3 
­0,2 
­1,3 
­0,7 
Dec. 
8,3 
7,9 
4,8 
16,1 
9,1 
15,8 
9,7 
1,7 
4,4 
7,0 
8,4 
6,1 
2,1 
J .in. 
0,8 
0,0 
0,6 
­0,2 
1,2 
0,4 
(0.3) 
(0,7) 
0,1 
0,1 
1,0 
0,2 
(0,5) 
0,6 
0,8 
Jan. 
­1,4 
8,0 
2,4 
­2,4 
5,7 
3,0 
­0,1 
0,2 
­3,0 
­2,3 
-0,5 
(1,6) 
­0,5 
1,3 
Jan. 
8,3 
7,9 
4,6 
15,9 
9,1 
16,1 
9,6 
1,7 
4,4 
7,2 
8,4 
6,2 
2,0 
1991 
Feb. 
0,3 
0,3 
0,3 
0,1 
­ 0 , 1 
0.2 
(0,3) 
(0,9) 
0,1 
0.1 
1,8 
0,5 
(0,4) 
0,1 
­0,3 
1991 
l e b . 
­3,3 
­1,3 
­3,1 
­0,9 
1,3 
­1,1 
5,4 
1,6 
(­0,4) 
­0,9 
­0,5 
1991 
Feb. 
8.5 
8,1 
4,6 
15,9 
9,2 
16,3 
9,6 
1,6 
4,3 
7.5 
8,5 
6,5 
2,0 
March 
­0.4 
0,2 
­0,1 
1,8 
0,3 
0,1 
(0,3) 0,2 
0,6 
0,5 
0,4 
(0,2) 
0,1 
0,5 
March 
­3,5 
0,0 
­7,4 
­3,0 
0.4 
­10,1 
0,2 
(­2,1) 
­0,4 
1.3 
March 
8,4 
8,1 
4,5 
15.8 
9,3 
16,7 
9,7 
1,6 
4,3 
7,9 
8,5 
6,8 
2,2 
April 
0.1 
0,2 
0,5 
3,4 
0,2 
0,2 
(0,4) ­0,4 
0,3 
0,8 
1,3 
(0,6) 
0,1 
(0,4) 
Change 
over 
12 months 
(%)(b) 
­1,7 
­8,4 
2,9 
­3,6 
­10,6 
­2,1 
11,9 
­2,0 
­2,6 
1,8 
8,6 
­5,4 
(­2,0) 
^»,2 
3,5 
Change 
over 
12 months 
(%)(c) 
0.4 
0,5 
­0,7 
-0,4 0,3 
1,4 
­0,2 
0,0 
­0,6 
­0,4 
1,6 
0,2 
15,0 
0,2 
Change 
over 12 months 
(%)(b) 
2,9 
2,6 
2,8 
21,5 
5,9 
3,1 
(2,5) 
(6.4) 
2,9 
2,6 
11,8 
6,4 
(4,9) 
4,9 
(3,6) 
T A B L E A . 4 : Visible t r a d e ba l ance — fob/cif, mi l l ion E C U (s .a . ) 
B/L 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EUR 12(i) 
1986 
146 
­1714 
53044 
­5809 
­6306 
9699 
983 
­2459 
4161 
­1297 
19868 
11161 
USA ­157829 ­
J A P X40I0 
1987 
­ 5 8 0 
96 
56960 
­ 5 6 9 4 
­ 8 7 4 9 
­ 1 2 4 7 3 
2047 
­ 7 4 2 7 
1088 
­ 2 9 5 5 
20890 
1424 
­132116 
69636 
1988 
­2543 
926 
60936 
­5824 
­11974 
­11856 
2740 
­8390 
1296 
­3474 
­42385 
­20549 
­100208 
65441 
T A B L E A . 5 : M o n e y s t o c k (ji— 
Β (M2) 
DK (M2) 
D (k) (M3) 
GR (M3) 
1986 
12,7 
Χ.4 
7.2 
19,0 
E (ALP) 12,1 
F (M2) 
IRL (M3) 
I (M2) 
NL (M2) 
Ρ (L­) 
UK (Μ4) 
EUR 12(1) 
USA (M2) 
J A P (M2) 
6.7 
­1,0 
9.4 
5.1 
26.3 
15,9 
10,1 
9.4 
9.2 
19S7 
10,2 
4.1 
6.4 
25,2 
14,6 
9,5 
10.9 
8,1 
3,9 
19,7 
16,3 
10,4 
3.5 
10,8 
1988 
7,6 
3,5 
7.0 
22.6 
12,1 
8,4 
6,3 
8,9 
13.7 
17,8 
17,6 
10,7 
5,5 
10.2 
1989 
­2108 
1226 
64056 
­7783 
­19803 
­13987 
3049 
­11098 
2893 
­5035 
­41827 
­30415 
­99420 
58691 
1990 
­5654 
1954 
44035 
­9229 
­19233 
­17275 
2505 
­9274 
­331 
­6240 
30905 
49647 
­78895 
41167 
1 
­880 
441 
18267 
­2478 
­5588 
­3862 
901 
­3329 
726 
­1434 
9377 
­6637 
­21298 
12836 
P e r c e n t a g e c h a n g e o n 
19S9 
13,1 
6,3 
4,5 
23,7 
10,4 
9.4 
5.0 
11.2 
14.2 
10.6 
19,1 
11,1 
5.0 
12,0 
1990 
4,0 
7,2 
5,3 
14.3 
11,7 
X.2 
15.4 
9,6 
8.0 
11.6 
12,1 
8,9 
3.3 
7.4 
I 
2,8 
4.4 
1.0 
2.6 
1,5 
1,7 
4.9 
1,7 
2.1 
2.2 
3,9 
2.1 
1.4 
3.1 
1990 
II 
­1532 
507 
13682 
­2806 
­5044 
­3786 
730 
­1430 
22 
­1527 
­7950 
­8941 ­
­16701 ­
10964 
preced 
1990 
II 
­1,5 
­0,3 
0,8 
3.9 
4,0 
2.5 
0.7 
2.0 
2.1 
4.9 
3,6 
2,2 
0.6 
2.3 
III 
­1253 
455 
10134 
­2545 
­4240 
­1839 
420 
­1548 
­435 
­1482 
­7350 
­12937 
­21726 
11202 
IV 
­1909 
528 
3789 
­1713 
­4659 
­1824 
486 
­2652 
­606 
­1825 
­5654 
­18604 
­19170 
6164 
ing p e r i o d (s . 
Ill 
1,2 
4,0 
1,6 
4.0 
2,1 
1,3 
7.5 
2.6 
1.8 
1.4 
2.3 
2,0 
0.9 
3,5 
IV 
1,5 
­0,9 
1.8 
3,0 
3,3 
2.6 
2.1 
3.0 
1.4 
2.7 
1,7 
2,3 
0.2 
­1,5 
1991 
1 
392 
­ 4 6 4 5 
­ 1 6 6 7 
­ 1 2 8 5 
­ 6 3 1 8 
13061' 
U 
1991 
1 
0,1) 
(­1,6) 
0.0 
1.7 
(2,9) 
1,8 
ί,5 
Sept. 
-166 
199 
2416 
-900 
-1396 
-1816 
159 
-618 
-322 
-543 
-2401 
-5434 
-7102 
3912 
Sept. 
1,2 
0,9 
3,3 
0.7 
1.1 
1,6 
1.5 
1.6 
0.6 
0,6 
1,0 
0.4 
2.4 
1990 
Oct. 
-733 
101 
3214 
-584 
-1765 
-1485 
102 
-1078 
-218 
-654 
2077 
-5198 
-8125 
1870 
1990 
Oct. 
0,1 0,9 
-0,1 
0,6 
0.2 
0.2 
1.0 
0.0 
0.9 
0,3 
0,6 
0,1 
-1,6 
Nov, 
-470 
78 
479 
-596 
-1632 
-1409 
98 
-2049 
-348 
-595 
1498 
7673 
-6453 
2398 
Nov. 
Ó.6 
0,4 
0,7 
1,0 
0.3 
1,3 
0.3 
0.5 
0.6 
1,6 
0.7 
0,0 
0.0 
Dec. 
-705 
350 
96 
-533 
-1262 
-1930 
285 
476 
^10 
-576 
-2079 
-5733 
-4591 
1897 
Dec. 
-1,6 
0,4 
2.5 
1,6 
2.1 
0.5 
1.7 
0.9 
1.1 
0.2 
1,0 
0,2 
-0,5 
Jan. 
-421 
19 
-2165 
-1867 
213 
-1469 
-20 
-617 
-2045 
(-7866) 
-5277 
3699 
Jan. 
4,3 
-0,1 
1,5 
1.1 
-0,2 
1.3 
-0,3 
0,6 0,6 
(0,2) 
0,1 
0.2 
1991 
Feb. 
-514 
128 
-1173 
-1505 
-283 
-1831 
-3854 
3664 
1991 
l eb . 
0,7 
0,6 
(-0,7) 
1,3 
0,2 
-0,4 
1.2 
(ί,ο) 1,0 
(0,7) 
0,7 
March 
246 
-1306 
-1295 
467 
-2441 
5698 
March 
(0,6) 
(0,6) 
-0,9 
0.9 
(1,2) 
(0,2) 
0,6 5.2 
Change 
over 
12 months 
(%)(d) 
-150 
14 
-1046 
186 
436 
-206 
-40 
1785 
-50 
-57 
838 
(-4877) 
1971 
823 
Change 
over 
12 months 
(%)(e) 
4,0 
8,7 
(9,5) 
13,4 
7,2 
10,5 
9,7 
7,7 
(12,4) 
(9,8) 
(8,5) 
3,3 
19 
T A B L E Α.6 : S h o r t ­ t e r m in te res t r a t e s (m) 
Β 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EUR 12 (η) 
USA 
J A P 
1986 
8,1 
9,1 
4,6 
19,8 
11,7 
7,7 
12,4 
12,8 
5,7 
15,6 
10,9 
9.2 
6,0 
5,0 
1987 
7,1 
9,9 
4,0 
14,9 
15,8 
8,3 
11,1 
11,4 
5,4 
13,9 
9,7 
8,9 
5,9 
3.9 
I9XK 
6,7 
8,3 
4,3 
15,9 
11,6 
7,9 
8,1 
11,3 
4,8 
13,0 
10,3 
8,6 
6,9 
4,0 
19S9 
8,7 
9,4 
7,1 
18,7 
15,0 
9,4 
9,8 
12,7 
7,4 
14,8 
13,9 
10,9 
8,4 
5,4 
1990 
9,8 
10,8 
8,4 
19,6 
15,2 
10,3 
11,4 
12,3 
8,7 
16,9 
14,8 
11,7 
7,8 
7,7 
I 
10,3 
11,8 
8,3 
17,1 
15,3 
10,3 
12,3 
12,8 
8,4 
17,3 
15,2 
11,8 
8,1 
7,6 
1990 
II 
9,4 
10,8 
8,2 
22,2 
15,0 
10,0 
10,3 
11,3 
8,3 
16,4 
14,9 
11,4 
8,0 
7,5 
Ill 
9,0 
10,2 
8,5 
19,1 
15,1 
10,3 
11,0 
10,7 
8,5 
17,0 
14,9 
11,4 
7,4 
8,5 
IV 
10,1 
9,9 
9,2 
23,3 
15,3 
10,1 
11,5 
13,8 
9,5 
17,2 
14,1 
12,1 
6,6 
8,2 
1991 
I 
9,4 
10,0 
9,0 
21,2 
13,0 
9,4 
10,7 
11,9 
9,2 
17,7 
12,4 
11,0 
5,9 
7,9 
Nov. 
9,0 
9,6 
9,0 
16,7 
15,0 
10,0 
10,8 
13,4 
9,0 
17,3 
13,6 
11,6 
7,3 
8,4 
1990 
Dec. 
10,1 
9,9 
9,2 
23,3 
15,3 
10,1 
11,5 
13,8 
9,5 
17,2 
14,1 
12,1 
6,6 
8,2 
Jan. 
9,8 
9,9 
9,1 
28,5 
15,0 
10,1 
11,2 
13,4 
9,1 
17,2 
13,9 
12,0 
6,4 
8,2 
Feb. 
9,3 
10,1 
9,0 
26,7 
14,4 
9,4 
11,1 
13,4 
9,0 
17,6 
12,8 
11,5 
6,3 
8.1 
1991 
March 
9,4 
10,0 
9,0 
21,2 
13,0 
9,4 
10,7 
11,9 
9,2 
17,7 
12,4 
11,0 
5,9 
7,9 
April 
9,2 
9,8 
9,1 
13,5 
9,3 
10,2 
12,1 
9,2 
17,8 
11,7 («g 
8,0 
May 
9,0 
9,6 
8,9 
12,4 
9,3 
10,2 
11,5 
9,1 
17,9 
11,4 
(1°# 
7,7 
Change 
over 12 months 
%(c) 
­0,9 
­1,1 
0,7 
4,1 
­2,6 
­0,5 
­0,9 
­0,9 
0,9 
1,5 
­3,8 
(­1,1) 
­2,3 
0,4 
T A B L E Α . 7 : L o n g ­ t e r m in te res t r a t e s (o) 
Β 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EUR 12 (η) 
USA 
J A P 
1986 
7,9 
10,5 
5,9 
15,8 
11,4 
8,4 
11,1 
11,7 
8,7 
6,4 
17,9 
9,8 
9,2 
8,1 
5,2 
1987 
7,8 
11,9 
5,8 
17,4 
12,8 
9,4 
11,3 
11,3 
8,0 
6,4 
15,4 
9,5 
9,4 
8,7 
4,7 
i 9X8 
7,9 
10,6 
6,1 
16,6 
11,8 
9,0 
9,4 
12,1 
7,1 
6,3 
14,2 
9.3 
9,4 
9,0 
4,7 
T A B L E Α . 8 : Va lue of E C U = 
BFR/LFR 
DKR 
D M 
DR 
PTA 
FF 
IRL 
LIT 
H F L 
ESC 
UKL 
USD 
YEN 
DTS 
1986 
43,80 
7,94 
2,13 
137,4 
137,5 
6,80 
0,733 
1462 
2,40 
146,9 
0,670 
0,983 
165,0 
0,838 
1987 
43,04 
7,88 
2,07 
156,1 
142,2 
6,93 
0,775 
1495 
2,33 
162,5 
0,705 
1,154 
166,5 
0,892 
T A B L E A . 9 : Effective 
B/L 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EUR 12 
USA 
J A P 
1986 
5,5 
6,3 
10,7 
­21,3 
­1,5 
4,5 
3,7 
3,7 
7,7 
­7,8 
­7,3 
9,6 
­19,1 
27,2 
I9S7 
4,1 
4,2 
6,9 
­9,9 
0,2 
1,1 
­2,1 
1,1 
5,1 
­7,1 
­1,0 
7,0 
­12,1 
8,2 
I9SX 
43,43 
7,95 
2,07 
167,5 
137,6 
7,04 
0,776 
1537 
2,34 
170,1 
0,664 
1,183 
151,5 
0,880 
19X9 
8,7 
10,2 
7,0 
13,8 
8,8 
9,0 
12,9 
7,7 
7,2 
14,9 
9,6 
10,0 
8,5 
5,2 
. . . un 
1989 
43,38 
8,05 
2,07 
178,8 
130,4 
7,04 
0,777 
1511 
2,34 
173,4 
0 , 6 7 3 . 
1.102 
151,8 
0,860 
1990 ­
10,1 
11,0 
8,9 
14,7 
9,9 
10,1 
13,4 
8,6 
9,0 
16,8 
11,1 
11,2 
8,6 
7,5 
I 
9,9 
11,0 
8,9 
14,9 
9,6 
10,4 
13,6 
8,5 
9,0 
16,9 
11,6 
11,3 
8,6 
7,5 
its o f n a t i o n a l 
1990 ­
42,42 
7,86 
2,05 
201,3 
129,4 
6,91 
0,768 
1522 
2,31 
181,1 
0,714 
1,271 
183,6 
0,937 
1 
42,55 
7,86 
2,04 
192,3 
131,6 
6,92 
0,768 
1512 
2,30 
179,8 
0,728 
1,206 
178,3 
0,917 
1990 
II 
9,8 
10,7 
9,0 
14,5 
9,7 
9,7 
13,4 
8,6 
9,0 
16,7 
10,9 
11,1 
8,5 
7,2 
III 
10,4 
11,3 
9,1 
15,1 
10,6 
10,5 
13,3 
8,6 
9,4 
17,1 
11,4 
11,5 
9,0 
8,4 
IV 
10,0 
11,0 
9,0 
14,5 
10,0 
9,7 
13,6 
8,5 
9,3 
17,7 
10,6 
11,2 
8,2 
7,2 
currency o r S D R 
1990 
II 
42,30 
7,82 
2,05 
200,5 
128,3 
6,90 
0,765 
1506 
2,31 
181,0 
0,730 
1,222 
189,8 
0,932 
III 
42,50 
7,89 
2,07 
203,0 
128,0 
6,93 
0,770 
1526 
2,33 
182,5 
0,696 
1.297 
188,1 
0,946 
IV 
42,35 
7,87 
2,05 
209,9 
129,9 
6,92 
0,768 
1542 
231 
181,2 
0,702 
1,367 
178,7 
0,954 
1991 
I 
9,4 
10,2 
8,5 
13,2 
9,2 
9,1 
13,5 
8,1 
8,8 
17,0 
10,0 
10,6 
8,3 
7,0 
1991 
I 
42,22 
7,88 
2,05 
219,2 
128,3 
6,97 
0,769 
1536 
2,31 
180,6 
0,702 
1,339 
179,0 
0,947 
e x c h a n g e r a t e s : e x p o r t aspect(p) — P e r c e n t a g e c h a n g e o n 
1988 
­1,3 
­1,9 
­0,8 
­7,2 
3,1 
­2,3 
­1,4 
­3,5 
­0,4 
­5,1 
5,7 
­1,6 
­6,1 
10,4 
1989 
­0,9 
­2,7 
­1,3 
­7,5 
4,1 
­1,3 
­1,3 
0,4 
­1,0 
­3,2 
­3,4 
3.0 
4,9 
­1,4 
Sources: For Community countries: Eurostat, ur 
(a) They do 
1990 
5,3 
7,6 
5,7 
­8,0 
5,1 
6,1 
5,8 
3,7 
3,9 
­1,3 
­0,8 
11,5 
­6,2 
­10,2 
I 
2.4 
3,6 
2,7 
­2,2 
1,5 
2,9 
2,6 
1,9 
1,9 
­0,3 
0,5 
5.7 
­2,2 
­5,7 
less otherwise speci 
not include building. Data are adjusted for working day? 
(b) % change over 12 months 
(c) Change with respect to the 
3n the basis of the non­adjusted scries 
corresponding month of the 
(d) Change on corresponding month 
(e) Change over 12 months in 
(f) Number 
îrevious 
previous 
1990 
II 
1,1 
1,4 
­0,1 
­3,5 
3,3 
0,9 
1,0 
1,1 
0,0 
­0,3 
0,6 
1,7 
0,2 
­5,4 
III 
0,2 
­0,1 
0,1 
­0,4 
1,2 
0,4 
­0,5 
­0,5 
­0,3 
­0,3 
6,5 
2,5 
­5,3 
3,9 
"ted; for the USA 
of the most recent 
/ear. 
/ear; seasonally adiusted. 
he s.a. figure of the most recent figure 
of unemployed estimated or 
(g) Number of registered unem 
(h) Monthly 
IV 
0,7 
0,8 
1,5 
­2,8 
­0,8 
0,8 
1,0 
­0,4 
1,0 
1,3 
0,0 
1.4 
­4.9 
8,6 
ind Japan 
1991 
1 
0­2 
­0,5 
­0,2 
­4,5 
1,0 
­1,2 
­0,5 
0,2 
0,0 
0,1 
0.4 
­0,8 
1,6 
1.3 
nationa 
figure given. 
given for each country. 
the basis of the results of Community 
ployed according to national legislation, as % o 
series calculated by linear interpolation. 
(i) The deseasonalized scries for EUR 1 
(j) National 
(k) Before J: 
(1) Average 
(m)National 
average ; 
2 is the result of a deseusona 
sources for Belgium. Denmark. Germany. Spain. France 
nuary 1991, the o 
of month 
sources ; 
Portugal 
d West C crmany. 
y changes s.a. weighted by 
three­month interb 
3 month treasury 
ink rate 
(monthly 
labour 
total la 
1990 
Nov. 
10,0 
11,0 
9,0 
14,6 
10,1 
10,1 
13,4 
8,6 
9,3 
16,7 
10,5 
11,1 
8,5 
7,8 
1990 
Nov. 
42,34 
7,87 
2,05 
210,3 
129,9 
6,91 
0,767 
1543 
2,32 
180,7 
0,703 
1,381 
178,1 
0,956 
preced in 
1990 
Nov. 
0,6 
0,6 
1,1 
­1,2 
0,1 
0,4 
0,9 
0,7 
0,7 
1,1 
­0,4 
1,5 
­1,0 
­0,1 
sources. 
Dec. 
10,0 
11,0 
9,0 
14,5 
10,0 
9,7 
13,6 
8,5 
9,3 
17,7 
10,6 
11/2 
8,2 
7,2 
Dec. 
42,27 
7,87 
2,04 
212,6 
130,5 
6,94 
0,767 
1540 
2,31 
181.1 
0,709 
1,367 
182,7 
0,958 
I p e r i o d 
Dec. 
0.2 
0,0 
0,6 
­1,1 
­0,4 
­0,4 
0,1 
0,3 
0,5 
­0,1 
­0,9 
0,2 
1,4 
­3,0 
Jan. 
9,7 
10,7 
9,1 
14,5 
9,6 
9,7 
13,7 
8,4 
9,4 
16,7 
10,0 
11,0 
8,3 
6,9 
Jan 
42,21 
7,89 
2,05 
216,8 
129,1 
6,96 
0,768 
1540 
2,31 
182,5 
0,702 
1.357 
181,4 
0,954 
Jan. 
0,0 
0.5 
­0.6 
2.1 
0,9 
­0,6 
­0,4 
­0,2 
­0,4 
­1,0 
0,8 
­0,7 
0,2 
0,2 
Feb. 
9,2 
10,3 
8,6 
14,3 
9,0 
9/2 
13,7 
8,3 
8,9 
16,6 
10,0 
10,7 
8,0 
6,7 
Feb. 
42,17 
7,88 
2,05 
219,5 
128,1 
6,97 
0,770 
1538 
2/31 
180,2 
0,704 
1,384 
180,4 
0.960 
Feb. 
0,4 
0,4 
0,5 
­ 0 , 9 
1,1 
0,1 
0,1 
0,6 
0,3 
1,6 
0,1 
0,9 
­ 1 , 6 
1.7 
orce surveys; annual average and quarterly average. 
lour force 
i/ation of the gross export and import figures of the Community. 
Portugal and the United Kingdom; seasonal adj 
1985 G D P prices and purchasing power parities. 
xcept: Belgium, up 
average) 
(n) Average weighted by 1985 G D P prices and purchasing 
(o) Yield on 
Netherla 
public sector bonds, annual 
ads and Portugal. 
average. Portugal. 
o January 
Annual average, en 
lower parities. 
1991,3 
The mon thly change 
Listment by 
1991 
March 
9,4 
10,2 
8,5 
13,2 
9,2 
9,1 
13,5 
8,1 
8,8 
17,0 
10,0 
10,6 
8,3 
7,0 
1991 
March 
42,28 
7,88 
2,05 
221,4 
127,6 
6,99 
0,770 
1531 
2,31 
179,1 
0,700 
1,279 
175,4 
0.926 
1991 
March 
­1,3 
­1,6 
­1,9 
­2,2 
­1,2 
­1,8 
­1,5 
­1,2 
­1,2 
­0,6 
­1,6 
^ t , l 
5,7 
­1,5 
April 
9,3 
10,2 
8,5 
12,5 
8,9 
9,1 
13,2 
8,0 
8,8 
17,4 
10,1 
10,4 
8,2 
7,1 
April 
42.41 
7,89 
2,06 
223,5 
127,3 
6,97 
0,771 
1528 
2,32 
179,0 
0 ,692 
1,210 
165,9 
0.895 
April 
­1,4 
­1,7 
­2,2 
­2,2 
­1,2 
­1,3 
­1,6 
­1,5 
­1,4 
­1,1 
­0,8 
­4,1 
2,8 
2,4 
May 
9,1 
10,0 
8,5 
11,9 
8,9 
9,1 
12,7 
17,8 
10,2 
(10,3) 
8,3 
7,1 
May 
42,35 
7,88 
2,06 
225,2 
127,4 
6,98 
0,769 
1528 
2,32 
179,0 
0,695 
1,199 
165,6 
0,893 
May 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
­0,9 
­0,3 
­0,3 
0,2 
­0,2 
0,1 
­0,1 
­0,7 
­0,5 
0,6 
­0,3 
Change 
over 12 months 
%(c ) 
­0,8 
­0,8 
­0,4 
­2,8 
­0,8 
­0,9 
­0,8 
­0,5 
­0,1 
0,9 
1.1 
(­0,9) 
­0,5 
­0,2 
Change 
over 12 months 
%(b) 
0,1 
0,9 
0,5 
11,7 
­0,5 
1,2 
0,6 
1,5 
0,7 
­1,1 
­5,3 
­2,7 
­12,5 
­4,4 
Change 
over 12 months 
% ( b ) 
-12 
­2,7 
­2/2 
­11,7 
­1,0 
­2,9 
­2,7 
­3,1 
­1,7 
­0,1 
3,9 
­1,2 
­1,8 
12,2 
Eurostat for Greece. Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. 
in Belgium is obta 
month treasury certificates; Denmark, daily money 
J quarter and end 
starting from 1990 before tax 
Bnd of quarter and end of month for 
(p) Weighting coefficients are calculated 
Notes: (s.a.) = seasonally adjusted 
so as to illow not 
= data not avaik 
>ther Men 
month. 
ned by 1 near interpolation of quarterly data. 
market rate (monthly average) ; Greece, monthly 
. Average of last month of quarter and annual average for Germany. 
ber Slates. 
only for bilateral trade but also for competition 
ble ( ) — estimated. 
on third markets and 
Spain. Iti ly, Luxembourg, the 
on the domestic market of the exporting country. 
20 
Principal economic policy measures — May 1991 
Community (EUR 12) 
22.5 Commission approves the revised version of the 1990/91 Annual 
Economic Report. 
22.5 Commission launches operational Social fund programmes in favour of 
the new German Länder. 
24.5 The EEC guaranteed prices for 1991/92 were adopted by the 
Agriculture Council. 
27.5 EEC Regional Policy: Commission adopts two programmes in favour 
of less developed Spanish regions. 
Belgium (B) 
None 
Denmark (DK) 
22.5 National bank lowers key lending and borrowing rates by 0,5%. 
Germany (D) 
14.5 The Bundestag adopts the tax-increase package for 1991 and 1992 
proposed by the Government. This includes increases in income tax and in the 
taxation of mineral oil, gas, tobacco and insurance contracts. The additional 
revenue could amount to some DM 20 billion in 1991 and DM 30 billion in 
1992, or 0,8% and 1,1% of West German GDP respectively. 
14.5 Unemployed workers in the new Länder are made eligible for the early 
retirement scheme as from the age of 55 (formerly 57) through a bill adopted by 
the Bundestag. Some 200 000 persons are affected by this measure in addition 
to the 400 000 already covered. 
Greece (GR) 
3.5 The Bank of Greece takes four decisions fully liberalizing, as from 
6.5.1991, vis-à-vis the other Community countries the following transactions : 
- tourist expenditure (the basic allowance of foreign banknotes and travellers' 
cheques is increased from ECU 1 200 to ECU 1 400 and that of local 
currency from DRS 10 000 to DRS 40 000; additional amounts in other 
forms are allowed on the basis of documentary evidence); 
- the use of credit cards abroad (until now subject to the limit of ECU 300 per 
person per year); 
- the acquisition by residents of real estate abroad; 
- the acquisition by residents of foreign long-term securities (bonds, shares, 
units of unit trusts). 
20.5 The Bank of Greece allows the investment banks to borrow funds on the 
interbank market up to the limit of 50% of their own funds. 
21.5 The Bank of Greece simplifies the procedures for buying foreign 
currency for payments abroad and the relevant administrative competences 
are transferred to the commercial banks. 
Spain (E) 
3.5 The Government approves the creation of a holding company merging 
Spain's six state-owned banks and thus becoming the country's largest 
financial institution. 
3.5 The Treasury cuts interest rate on three-year Treasury bills by 0,2 of a 
percentage point, to 12,5%, on five year bills by 0,3 point, to 12,3%, and on 
ten-year bonds by 1,65 point, to 11,8%. 
16.5 The Bank of Spain cuts its official intervention rate by 0,75 point, to 
12,75%. 
23.5 The Treasury cuts the interest rate on 12-month paper by 0,8 point, to 
11,75%. 
30.5 The Treasury cuts the interest rates on its three to five year securities by 
around one point and the rate on its ten-year bonds by 0,6 point ; they are now 
set at 11,4%, 11,3% and 11,3% respectively. 
30.5 Parliament approves the new personal income tax law. 
France (F) 
None 
Ireland (IRL) 
None 
Italy (I) 
11.5 The Government adopts a supplementary fiscal package totalling 
LIT 14 200 billion in order to stem the emerging budget deficit overrun. 
Additional revenues are mainly due to increases in indirect taxation on selected 
products, reductions in tax payments delays and social security contributions 
increases while savings are obtained mainly by acting upon the loans and 
advances made by the Treasury to the local authorities and the social security 
system. 
12.5 The Treasury, acting upon the advice of the Bank of Italy, cuts the 
discount rate by one percentage point, from 12,50% to 11,50%. 
Luxembourg (L) 
None 
Netherlands (NL) 
None 
Portugal (P) 
None 
United Kingdom (UK) 
24.5 Bank base rates are cut a half percentage point to 11 1/2%. In 
consequence, most mortgage interest rates also drop by 1/2% to around 
12 1/2%. 
Prices (excluding VAT) in Luxembourg 
Ecu 
'European Economy' (4 issues per year) 
Supplements 
Single copy 
Series A — 'Economic trends' 
(11 issues per year) 
Series B — 'Business and consumer survey results' 
( 11 issues per year) 
Complete series of supplements 
Combined subscription — 'European Economy' and supplements 
70 
4 
28.50 
28,50 
57 
11)5 
The annual subscription runs from 1 January to 
31 December of each year. 
Payments to be made only to the agents in the countries 
listed on page 3 of the cover of European Economy. 
These are surface mail rates; for air subscription rates 
please apply to the agents. 
ca * OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
O P * OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES —·— * * * * 
L—2985 — Luxembourg 
CM-AS-91-006-EN-C 
